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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is an examination of the relationship between integrity and selflessness. The research 
is based on philosophical work by Nancy Schauber, Jeremey Bentham, John Stuart Mill, 
Aristotle, Aquinas, Alasdair MacIntyre and others. Using this work, I argue that the relationship 
between the two conditions of human nature, selflessness, and integrity, is critical to the good 
life. I argue that to live selflessly and with integrity is our best chance of being happy. Living a 
selfless life of integrity not only leads to personal happiness, but contributes to the happiness of 
others both directly (by helping and consoling others) and indirectly (by showing others how 
happiness is possible). I argue that this theory works in all conditions. This leads me to a concept 
of how happiness works in a community which I call the happiness bank.  My theory is that 
integrity and selflessness lead both to a good and happy life, but also to a happiness bank. The 
happiness bank is something that individuals contribute to through other-directed good actions, 
and make withdrawals from when they need the help and consolation of others. Contributions by 
individuals increase happiness within a community and form the primary moral resource of the 
community. A happiness bank grows, and its contributions multiply like compound interest. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an attempt to argue for the role of integrity and selflessness in a good life. A 
good life produced in this way is very robust. It remains a good life in the face of many 
uncertainties and vicissitudes. This is also the basis, I argue, for something I call the happiness 
bank. The concept of the happiness bank is of a repository of the good deeds and virtuous actions 
that we perform towards others. It can never become full enough and it establishes the moral 
foundation of a community. It is something that grows as people contribute to it. It bears interest 
and it enables withdrawals. It works like a bank and it enables the ill, the disabled, the 
marginalized, the abandoned and the downtrodden to have an honoured place in society. 
 The thesis consists of five chapters. In chapter one, I set out my account of integrity. I do 
so through a critical examination of the views of Nancy Schauber. In chapter two, I set out my 
account of selflessness. I do this through an examination of the utilitarian thought of Jeremey 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill. In chapter three, I turn to the work of Alasdair MacIntrye. I argue 
that he gives a distinctive account of the virtues of acknowledged dependence and that an 
account of selflessness and its role in the happiness is built on this foundation. In chapter four, I 
examine the relationship between virtue and happiness, working with Aristotle and St Thomas 
Aquinas. In the final chapter, I elaborate my concept of the happiness bank. 
 The argument strategy of the thesis proceeds in three stages. The first stage is to establish 
the plausibility of a particular conception of integrity and another conception of selflessness. 
Integrity, I argue, is best thought of in moral terms. It is a disposition to do the next right thing. 
This is a conceptual claim. Selflessness is most plausibly thought of as putting others ahead of 
oneself. This is to say that a selfless person orientates their life towards things that have value for 
others before things that have value only for themselves (for example, their own pleasures). This 
is another conceptual claim. The second stage of the argument relates integrity and selflessness 
to happiness. The claim here is that living with integrity and selflessness offers by far the best 
chance for human happiness. This is an empirical claim, one based on my own experience and 
reading. It is a proposal for future empirical research rather than a definitive philosophical 
conclusion. The third stage of the argument is the introduction of a new idea about how 
communities flourish, given the argument of the first two stages of the thesis. This is the idea of 
the ‘happiness bank’. A happiness bank is based on virtuous activity done by people in a 
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community for other people because they have integrity and selfless ideas about how things 
should be done for others in society. This is essentially a normative claim. It is a claim about 
how we ought to act towards each other. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTEGRITY 
 
INTRODUCTION TO ROLE OF INTEGRITY  
In the present chapter, I examine the role of Integrity in a life well lived. I will argue that 
Integrity is a vital ingredient of a good life. Nancy Schauber argues in ‘Integrity, Commitment 
and the Concept of a Person’ (1996) that integrity is not worth striving for. It is either something 
that we possess simply in virtue of being a person or it is not worth having at all. I argue that 
Schauber is wrong about this. When we understand integrity correctly, it is not only clearly an 
essential ingredient in a good life, but also something we must work at, to keep. Integrity is much 
discussed in the philosophical literature (Calhoun (1995); Cox, La Caze and Levine (2003); 
Halfon (1989); McFall (1987); Taylor (1981); Williams (1973.) I have chosen to highlight 
Schauber’s work on integrity because it crystalizes just what I think goes wrong with concepts of 
integrity that fail to take into account virtues as constitutive of integrity.   
 To argue for this, it is important to establish the meaning of the term ‘Integrity’. Integrity 
is sometimes defined as being true to your word, true to a set of principles, and true to your 
promises and commitments, even when it may be difficult to be true to them. However, this 
definition misses something important. It misses the fact that the principle we abide by must be 
directed towards what is valuable to others, not just to ourselves, otherwise, integrity becomes 
something self-centered and isolating, and eventually a cause of unhappiness and even misery. I 
have developed this point by arguing that genuine integrity requires selflessness, not merely to 
be thoughtful of others, but thinking of others’ needs first. Ultimately, I wish to argue that 
happiness emerges within a life that is lived for others with genuine integrity. This is a life of 
honesty and commitment to the needs of others before my own. 
 Nancy Schauber (1996) has tried to develop a new idea about what integrity means. 
Schauber argues that integrity is not a virtue, and that it is not something worth striving for. She 
dismisses the idea that integrity is a matter of remaining true to moral virtues, saying that this 
collapses into the idea of virtue per se and that the idea of integrity adds nothing to this. The 
other concept of integrity she discusses is ‘self-unifying’ integrity. She says that this kind of 
integrity is a matter of remaining true to one’s commitments. However, she argues, our 
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commitments come in two sorts: passive commitments and active commitments. To be true to 
our active commitments, when it is right to be so, is a matter of promise keeping. The concept of 
integrity adds nothing to this. To be true to our passive commitments is of no value unless the 
commitments remain of value to us. Once we no longer care about a passive commitment, such 
as a friendship, then the commitment ought not to compel our actions. It is no longer important 
to us. We gain and lose friendships in this manner. So integrity is either something that comes 
easily to us, in virtue of having commitments we care about, or it is of no value. For example, if 
a friendship ends, stubbornly continuing the relationship is of no value. Integrity, therefore, on 
her view is not an important human virtue. On her interpretation, happiness is not a byproduct of 
integrity. This may be the entire reason her argument is worth looking at. It will also help 
strengthen my argument when it comes to justifying why virtue plays such an important role in 
integrity. The fact that we do argue for virtue as a valuable part of any type of life, that includes 
faithfulness, honesty and wholeness, will show that integrity, when used in a selfless manner, is 
worth having. We will take the integrity argument several steps further than the Schauber 
argument. The reason for this is quite simple. My view of integrity is not of something self-
centered. Integrity does not have one and only one person at its very core. Schauber thinks of 
integrity as a self-regarding condition. But integrity, in my view, focuses on commitment as a 
way of life to oneself and others.  
My conception of integrity is not passive. It is active and moves us to act. When one is 
either taught, or learns a life of active integrity, that person is taking the right actions for all the 
right reasons. Usually it is based on a selfless point of view. To work for others and their benefit 
is an active form of integrity. So the relationship between integrity and selflessness is all about 
what kind of person one should be and what is the right action. To give it a more definite and 
practical description, selflessness, integrity, and happiness, when put together, spell out an 
unbeatable combination and way of life. 
 
INTEGRITY AND VIRTUE  
Schauber (1996) presents many interesting claims about integrity. She says “attributing integrity 
to a person is arguably the most respectful praise we offer” (p. 119). Then in the very next 
sentence she claims, “But esteeming integrity so highly is typically based on a misunderstanding 
of what integrity is” (p. 119).  Schauber goes on to say that this type of esteem may be the result 
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of assuming that one’s integrity is part of a virtue. However, it is plausible to say that virtue is a 
very important part of integrity. Schauber questions whether or not such a virtue, of which 
integrity is a part, could be used as a measuring stick for our lives. She calls for caution for any 
person calling integrity a virtue. 
I would argue a person of integrity would not, or should not, make a distinction between 
passive and active concerns, beliefs, projects, interests, as Schauber does. Nor should a person of 
integrity make such things disposable and simply direct his or her life elsewhere whenever it 
seems reasonable to them to do so. This is clearly a self-centered view point that has no virtue 
content as a component of the integrated whole self; it does not accommodate one who cares not 
only about the self, but about others and the betterment of mankind. 
Schauber’s view of integrity deprives her of a way of discriminating between first order 
desires – desires for various outcomes – and second order desires – desires aimed at desires. This 
means that a shallow and dependent person could have integrity as she understands it. Calhoun 
develops the point this way.  
 
As Gabrielle Taylor argues, how one comes to endorse a first order 
desire matters. If a person does so only because her group does, 
without having any reasons for her own thinking that these are 
right values, then her second order volitions will not really be her 
own. “She/he has to find out from others which desires to identify 
with, or indeed what sorts of desires she should have” (op. cit., p. 
116). (Calhoun, 1995, p. 237). 
 
In addition, as Taylor also observes, unless the individual 
regards her endorsements as primia facie committing her to 
making the same endorsements on future occasions, she will be no 
more than shallowly sincere, wholeheartedly identifying with one 
set of desire today and a different set tomorrow (op. cit., p. 113) 
(Calhoun, p. 237).  
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Integrity is in part about acting on one’s own views and expressing one’s own agency, 
but it has to be much more than that. This is really where the Schauber article misses the mark. 
Integrity has to be more about practical reasoning and finding meaning in all the days of one’s 
life. That life must contain the virtues in relation to oneself before it may be distributed to others 
in a selfless manner. One simply must stand with one’s best judgment at one’s side in each 
instance of life. These virtues must stand as the building blocks of any type of integrity. Also this 
must be a part of the cornerstone of any type of life one would want to live. 
 
COMMITMENT AND PROMISES: 
Schauber’s view of integrity is that it is something quite fluid and flexible, not even a component 
of virtue. She also makes a distinction between active and passive commitments as expressions 
of integrity. However, one of the major issues with this argument relates to her understanding of 
the importance of commitment and promising: “Active commitments, like promises, are 
something others have a right to require one to honor” (Schauber, 1996, p. 120). However, she 
writes: “Passive commitments, by contrast, are things one finds oneself in by virtue of one’s 
concerns” (p. 121). However, it seems plausible to say that virtue is a very important part of 
integrity and that persons of integrity need to be virtuous in general and that is why they would 
keep their commitments. We either make time for our commitments, or we make excuses for 
ourselves. I believe we either learn to discipline ourselves towards our fundamental 
commitments or we let them and thus our self-preservation fall by the wayside. In my view, 
when we make a promise, we are obliged to fulfill it and discharge the promise regardless of our 
preferences and feelings, and then we become credible. In other words, to a person who has 
become principled about certain things and about certain aspects of their life, promises become 
paramount. At the same time, because we are true to ourselves, to our commitments and to 
others, we have motives to make and keep promises and ultimately to uphold our integrity. 
Continuing Schauber’s argument about promises, we must try to differentiate between 
what she calls active and passive. Schauber claims that any “…passive commitment is essential 
to an adequate conception of a person, quite independent of concerns about personal integrity” 
(p. 121). She thinks that passive commitments are an automatic feature of being a person and are 
not something that we need to nurture or care about or pay special attention to. When they no 
longer have a grip on us, there is no reason at all why we shouldn’t abandon them. I think that 
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this just cannot be true for anyone concerned with other people and their projects. Passive 
commitments mostly involve us with other people. They are friendships and relations of caring 
for others. To be a person who takes no special care of their passive commitments shows no deep 
concern for how those commitments affect others. To care about others is at the same time to 
care about our passive commitments, and show how we care about ourselves.  
Schauber also questions why should we think that active commitment “cannot yield a 
plausible conception of self or consequently of integrity” (p. 121). However, I would argue that 
active commitments are essential to integrity. If I am to be truly committed to myself and my 
projects one hundred percent, then I must be committed to others and I must make good on my 
promises to them. My promises are part of who I am and what I stand for.  
Schauber further claims that promising is merely a social practice. Here is another place 
to take exception. She states that it involves more than one person, “the one who makes the 
promise and the other who accepts it, the latter having the right to see it discharged, the right to 
release the promisor from the promise” (p. 121). A vow to ourselves, according to Schauber, 
either way, whether breaking or maintaining a promise, does not mean much. However, I would 
argue that a person of integrity does not necessarily make a promise either just to be in a 
community of promisors or to be released from the promise at a later date. A person of integrity 
makes promises to themselves because they take their relationship to their future self very 
seriously.  
 I question the notion, that “active commitments by themselves, being strictly 
performative, are not representative of the real self, so that if a person succeeds in upholding 
only active commitments, she has not thereby kept her real self-intact, nor does she possess 
integrity in any distinctive sense” (p. 123). Instead the claim is made she is “merely reliable”. I 
propose that when people actively continually show up for their commitments it is an act of their 
will. It is a form of active commitment and thus an act of integrity.  
 Schauber talks about passive commitments as being “features of ourselves that are for the 
most part, discovered, or at any rate, not directly subject to our will” (p. 123). One could 
conclude that it is through our commitments, our projects, and our integrity that we truly 
discover who we are and just who we have the potential to become. This cannot happen through 
the passive commitments alone.  
 Schauber writes regarding the passivity of integrity,   
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“Integrity is a trait that we would try to cultivate in ourselves. But 
this argument doesn’t help. For one thing, what counts as a reason 
for deciding on one project rather than another must be based on 
some antecedent sense of what is important, or what one cares 
about, and this is most plausibly understood as a passive 
commitment” (p. 123).  
 
Schauber makes claim that “the real self is fluid” at least in the model she proposes on 
page 124. Moreover, in her model of life, projects, concerns, and desires need only be 
momentary. Mainly, she claims, because, “commitments are constitutive of one’s self only for as 
long as it seems reasonable to act on them” (p. 124). She also claims “we may reasonably 
abandon those commitments, or at least oversee the demise of them” (p. 124). 
Herein lies Schauber’s mistake. The line “what one cares about” that Schauber 
emphasizes, turns out to be important. First of all, if we know a person who has a consistent 
character, we can take them as an exemplar of a strong person, a person of integrity. If we 
abandon our passive commitments as soon as they seem to us to diminish in importance, we are 
letting ourselves down and failing to set a good example for others. A person of integrity is 
dependable. Time after time a person of integrity will demonstrate a proven track record of being 
dependable.  If there was an emergency, you could call on them. Others can count on them; they 
can count on themselves.  
 Is, “integrity built into our concept of a person or self” as Schauber claims on page 124? 
Could it be true that there is no need to work for integrity as something valuable, or even a 
principle that humans strive for, as she suggests?  
We should not diminish the meaning of integrity. Most of us learn the significance of it at 
a very early age. We learn just what integrity is and what it means. We in fact follow examples 
of it in everyday life. These examples, as we submit to them, accompany us throughout our lives. 
We become accustomed to just exactly what integrity means for us and what deep meaning and 
selfless purpose it represents in our lives; and of course the lives of many others. 
When a person is essentially divided up into a world of active and passive promises or a 
life that is not wholly integrated, of sound moral integrity, things like virtue required for this type 
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of coherence are not available. As a result a truthful and honest life built on commitment to 
selflessness and thereby to others, even one’s nation, may not be built. So just why is it that 
people the world over pay attention to their obligations, responsibilities and commitments? 
People appear to have taken very seriously the need to live a principled and consistent life 
throughout history and, probably, pre-history. To live with integrity is to take one’s life very 
seriously, but there is no way of doing this without taking one’s obligations, responsibilities and 
commitments very seriously indeed. They should not be left to the unrestrained passive self in 
which passive commitments are discarded at a moment’s notice. 
In her 1995 article ‘Standing for Something’ Cheshire Calhoun does an articulate job in 
pointing out just why a person who is divided may never know the nuances of integrity. She 
discusses Harry Frankfurt. 
 
Etymologically, integrity is related to an integer, a whole number, 
and to integration the unification of parts into a whole. The 
integrated-self picture of integrity begins from this etymological 
observation, and the resulting description of the person of integrity 
as a whole integrated self owes a good deal to Harry Frankfurt’s 
work on freedom and responsibility. On this view, the integration 
of the self, and hence integrity, requires first of all that one not be a 
“wanton”. Frankfurt imagines wantons to be individuals who either 
lack the capacity or simply fail to deliberate and make up their 
minds about which of their desires they want to be volitionally 
effective. As a result wantons act on which ever desire happens to 
be psychologically strongest at the moment. Because the wanton is 
passive in relation to what moves him, Frankfurt concludes, the 
wanton’s desires are, in an important sense, not his and, as a result, 
neither are his actions. Such a being lacks integrity altogether 
(Calhoun, 1995, p. 236). 
 
I think Frankfurt is right about this. Being a wanton is the opposite of having 
integrity. A person who abandons their projects because they appear to them to 
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have lost, perhaps for the moment, their value and meaning, is very close to a 
wanton. They live at the mercy of their whims. 
 
VIRTUE AND HONESTY 
Schauber presents conflicting views of honesty. On the one hand, she acknowledges the moral 
significance of making promises. On the other hand, however, she thinks this is not important for 
integrity. However, let us take this just a little bit further. When one is honest one simply has 
principles and motivations attached to some underlying cardinal virtue that leads to many kinds 
of honest action, including truth telling. This way of living is authentic, motivated, and when 
these evaluative judgements are used on a consistent basis integrity is a part of one’s life. And 
when others get to see the results of one’s values and judgements one becomes part of a 
flourishing society. A principled person of integrity becomes a happy person because the actions 
they espouse are reflections of commitments to the self and others. Integrity, commitment and a 
selfless nature give a being character. Certainly the virtue of honesty when given a persistent trial 
will tend to produce other virtues. To honour commitments to ourselves and other people is 
really about becoming the honest person one would like to be.  
Are there really any special circumstances, as Schauber suggests, in which a person may 
deceive without diminishing her integrity? Schauber makes the claim that 
“…more controversial is the claim that to possess integrity is to be 
honest, this may not be true. If being honest entails saying what 
one thinks, persons of integrity are not necessarily honest. 
Furthermore, there are special circumstances in which a person 
may deceive without diminishing her integrity”. (Schauber, p. 119) 
 
Schauber is not at all clear about this. Does she mean that the “special circumstances” in which 
one may deceive are situations in which one has a greater moral duty to, for instance, protect 
others from severe harm than one has to tell the truth? If one has a moral duty to deceive, then 
deception does not undermine one’s integrity. Otherwise it does.  
It is important for integrity to be clear and honest with oneself and others about such 
things as personal happiness, justice, conflicting commitments, or even conditional types of 
commitment that may not be ranked. Some of these commitments we acquire early in life, and 
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hopefully they become an integral part of our character and define the type of person we want to 
become. They involve things like truth telling and kindness, two very simple virtues. When 
kindness, truth and fidelity are combined, the idea of hurting another human through lying or 
deception falls by the wayside. The reason is simple, because one knows one must retain the 
courage of one’s convictions, including one’s commitment to being honest. To be the type of 
person who succumbs to temptation, to sell out, to deceive another for selfish reasons is certainly 
contrary to integrity.  
If this is right, there is a close connection between being dishonest and being a sell-out. 
Every corrupt person is likely to be dishonest with themselves and others. Dishonesty, 
untruthfulness generally involves self-deception. Honesty is a cardinal virtue and must have 
value for its own sake. How could any person who desires true happiness not also desire truth 
and beneficial things it brings about, things like kindness and benevolent action towards one’s 
fellows. Sometimes truths may become repugnant to us and hard for us to accommodate. A 
person may want to deceive others for the sake of their own happiness or the happiness of others. 
But this easy thought gives us permission to go down a slippery slope to vices. This is the worse 
use of the free will and a free fall of integrity that started by little habits and acts of dishonesty. 
Good use of the free will is certainly a part of virtue and an important aspect of morality.  
Schauber considers the possibility that integrity is the same things as sincerity. She says, 
“Perhaps a person of integrity is sincere” (p. 119). She then goes on to say this sincerity suggests 
that one’s words represent quite accurately what one, in fact, feels. She rightly concludes that 
sincerity is “evidently different from integrity” (p. 119). The reason is that merely being honest 
about one’s feelings and emotions is not enough to ensure that one has virtue. Integrity is 
connected to honesty, but honesty is different from sincerity. To be sincere is to display one’s 
inner thoughts and feelings to others. But an honest person can still keep private matters private, 
as long as they are not being manipulative and deceptive. 
Let us try to unpack these statements a bit. As humans we cannot afford to respond 
merely to emotions or feelings and treat them as something we must at all costs communicate to 
others. What matters for integrity is the strength of your commitment, not the strength of your 
feelings. Our integrity must remain steadfast though any of life’s difficulties, and yes, “A person 
of integrity is sincere” (p. 119) in one sense of “sincerity.” That’s not the sense in which 
sincerity requires us to display our thoughts and feelings to others, no matter what reason we 
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may not do so. Sincerity, in a different sense, involves being true to our words. We make 
promises, for example, sincerely, when we really mean to make them. The relationship between 
words and feelings is really quite simple. Words if used properly when they are sincere are a call 
to action, and action is a very telling word when it refers to integrity. So words are actionable 
and make a difference in people’s lives in regard to integrity; feelings and emotions are just what 
they are and they pass with time. There must be some sort of first person requirement between 
how one acts on one’s principles and the action itself. One must have sufficient cause to take 
right actions, for the right reasons; and thus the sincerity of those same actions become not just 
words or feelings but a virtuous harmonious cause. One may not feel one’s way to integrity. 
 Schauber further quotes an article titled, “Integrity” by Gabriele Taylor, whose innermost 
notion of integrity, is a person who “keeps his inmost self-intact; whose life is of a piece, whose 
self is whole and integrated” (1981). Being true to one’s commitments is a part of this self-
unifying integrity. So it follows that when we say what we really mean, we are looking at 
someone who is quite faithful to all their principles, even in the face of adversity. 
Schauber makes a dubious claim, “The core of integrity, some kind of steadfastness, is 
not by itself admirable, the steadfast person may be worse than someone more inconstant” (p. 
120). All things considered, a steadfast person is in fact better than a changeable and unreliable 
person. A person of very bad values may do more harm to others because they are steadfast, but 
this is because of their bad values not because of their steadfastness. The two conditions of 
integrity that Schauber doesn’t seem to ascribe to, at least in any long term view, are to have 
commitments and to be true to them. Integrity, virtue and a foundation in them, is about building, 
maintaining and putting your whole existence into a higher plane of principle and commitment, 
something greater than ourselves. A shifting foundation in the realm of passive commitments 
shows a lack of wholeness of character; being true not only to oneself but also to humanity, 
spells out the necessary unity of self we should seek. 
Schauber claims, “There is little point in discussing integrity if it is merely identical to 
the sum of virtue, or any other particular virtue” (p. 120). I would argue, most people will come 
around to a moral way of life as a result of seeing the evidence of their own integrity and its 
effect on others. And why not think of integrity as the sum of virtue especially in the light of 
what effect it might have on others? Our evaluations of the reasons for which we act are essential 
for our own and humanity’s flourishing, happiness and good. The most valuable concept of 
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integrity is the one that helps and guides us to contributing to flourishing society. I will argue this 
point in chapter three, when I discuss the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre. 
 
 
OTHER VIEWS OF INTEGRITY: 
In this section, I examine other views of integrity. The first conception I consider is Cheshire 
Calhoun’s view. She sums it up like this. 
 
Jim Baker, for instance, persuaded many people to invest money in 
doing God’s work. His embezzling revealed that he had misled 
them either about the value of doing God’s work or the value of his 
doing it. Neither the integrated self nor the identity picture of 
integrity can explain why misleading others, by itself and not 
because of its deleterious effects on the hypocrite, has anything to 
do with lacking integrity. If, however, integrity is not a merely 
personal virtue but the social virtue of acting on one’s own 
judgment because doing so matters to deliberators’ common 
interest in determining what is worth doing, then hypocritical 
misrepresentation of one’s own best judgment clearly conflicts 
with integrity (Calhoun, 1995, p. 258,259).  
 
What Calhoun means is that integrity is about standing by one’s own convictions, but 
only because we need to work together as a community to decide what to do. According to her, 
integrity isn’t about being virtuous, but about being socially cooperative deliberators. I don’t 
think this is strong enough. Integrity is the quality we aim at when we try to live the best life we 
can aim for. This is why integrity is so important to us personally, and why it is worth striving 
for, and why it makes us exemplars for others.  
Lynn McFall has a different conception of integrity. In her 1987 article, she sets out two 
different dictionary definitions of integrity as follows: 
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The Oxford English Dictionary, compacted, “Integrity means 
soundness of moral principle; the character of uncorrupted virtue, 
especially in relation to the truth and fair dealing; uprightness, 
honesty, sincerity”. The American Heritage Dictionary says that 
Integrity is “strict personal honesty and independence”. Webster’s 
New International Dictionary defines Integrity as an 
uncompromising adherence to a moral, artistic, or other values; 
utter sincerity, honesty, and candor; avoidance of deceptions, 
expediency, artificially, or shallowness of any kind” (p. 5). 
  
McFall further specifies the connection between integrity and virtue. She writes: 
 
If integrity is a moral virtue, then it is a special sort of virtue. One 
cannot be solely concerned with one’s own integrity, or there would 
be no object for one’s concern thus integrity seems to be a higher 
order virtue. To have moral integrity, then it is natural to suppose 
that one must have some lower order moral commitments; that 
moral integrity adds a moral requirement to personal integrity 
(McFall, 1987, p. 14). 
 
McFall makes a distinction between personal integrity and moral integrity. I don’t 
think there is such a distinction. You either have integrity or you do not. Integrity 
without moral virtue would not be worth striving for; to be true to oneself is to try 
to live as well as one can – a way of life that yields greater and greater benefits for 
oneself and others. Integrity is about being true to oneself in this sense and the 
distinction between personal integrity and moral integrity has no application here.  
The other major view of integrity that I will briefly discuss is the self-unification view. 
According to this view, integrity is a matter of being whole and unified. For instance, according 
to Cox, LaCaze and Levine, 2003 (p. 44, 43): 
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When self-unifying integrity is adequately explained, the reasons 
for pursuing it are anything but question begging. The pursuit of 
such integrity is not some abstract end in itself, but is essential to 
our agency and to our self-conception as an individual actively 
engaged with others and, in a sense, with ourselves over time. 
Identity, in the current context, is not static, there is nothing in the 
notion of self-unifying integrity which suggests that a person of 
integrity would keep all promises at all costs. Always keeping our 
promises, whether to others or ourselves, hardly seems wise. 
Deciding which promises to keep in life’s changing circumstances 
is one of life’s problems. What self-unifying integrity measures is 
our capacity to consider choices concerning our future 
undertakings and current self-understandings in full view of our 
past. 
 
What self-unifying does is to unify past, present and future self. 
The attempt to be a unified self is important, but it is not enough. To be worth striving 
for, our unified self must be something we are satisfied with and can live with. We have to live 
with ourselves; and for this purpose self-consistency is not enough. Integrity is best considered 
as that condition of living that we should always strive towards. Thus self-unification accounts of 
integrity miss a vital ingredient. Integrity also makes its possessor a role-model to others. Self-
unification is not enough for this. Virtue which includes soundness of moral principle, 
uncorrupted character, truth telling, uprightness, honesty, sincerity, candor or uncompromising 
adherence to moral values is a clearly better definition of integrity.  
 
ARISTOTLE ON VIRTUE: 
Integrity is closely tied to virtue; to live with integrity is to live virtuously. Having integrity 
doesn’t mean that one never makes mistakes, including perhaps serious moral mistakes. But it 
does mean that one succeeds in approaching life virtuously. I will conclude this chapter with a 
brief discussion of what Aristotle considers to be a virtuous life. 
16 
 
 Aristotle says “a person who becomes knowledgeable, must choose acts, however he 
must choose them for their own sake” (Cruzer, 2002, p. 1), and finally he states, “These actions 
must come from a firm and unchangeable sense of character” (Cruzer, 2002, p. 1). 
 Aristotle lists five parts of virtue. 
 
•  One very important one is the ability to label any acts that are virtuous in a situation.  
•  Secondly, we must get some idea of why they might be considered virtuous. 
•  Thirdly, are any of the virtuous acts we desire, acts just for their own sake? 
•  Fourth, a virtuous character will have a disposition to act virtuously, and 
•  Fifth, comes along a type of virtuous passion that Aristotle refers to.  
  
Thereby, this virtuous person automatically acts and feels right naturally. In fact Aristotle calls it, 
‘doing the right thing” (Cruzer, 2002, p. 1). However, the real question is, as human beings, how 
is it that we start to desire virtuous acts for their own sake? 
 The transition takes place when we have arrived at what Aristotle calls a guided type of 
judgment or habitual thinking that is now just and noble. You now have the keen ability to act on 
your part. I would argue experience, tells one, trying your best to practice Aristotle’s as Cruzer 
calls it, “the right thing”, can bring about further noble acts because of the results it brings. That 
result is the inner happiness and contentment they bring. Many will argue, who is right and who 
is wrong in this life, but for the noble, just, and virtuous, it is a matter of what is right.  
 Some would draw the distinction that the virtuous acts towards other people do not 
always get the hoped for result or even response. This is true enough. Sometimes even a noble 
virtuous act can be quite painful; however, it is not worth the interruption of one’s peace of mind 
or serenity to change a lifestyle. One’s inner happiness and harmony is often worthwhile when it 
comes to the encouragement of others who may be in a mineshaft of shame, guilt and remorse 
with no way out. 
 One of the many self-destructive human emotions that seem to occupy more of 
humanity’s time than many others, is resentment. Along with its corrosive, harmful effects on the 
person carrying the resentment, they can spoil the relationships between people for a day or even 
years. Friendships of decades can be lost in an hour. Sometimes, integrity can be learning to hold 
one’s tongue in certain situations where otherwise it could possibly cause harm. However, if one 
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is to make a mistake, an apology must be made in the interest of the other person and to attempt 
to head off any resentment.  
In the following quote Aristotle shows the difference in people who lead a virtuous life: 
While arguments seem to have the power to encourage and 
stimulate the generous – minded among the young, and to make a 
character which is gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, 
ready to be possessed by virtue, they are not able to encourage the 
many to nobility and goodness. For these do not by nature obey the 
sense ofaid aidos (shame, guilt, remorse), but only fear, and do not 
abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of 
punishment.’ (As cited in Cruzer, 2003, p. 6). 
  
According to Burnyeat, Aristotle had the viewpoint that, “the things you love in this sense are 
what you enjoy or take pleasure in. Moreover, Aristotle insists that people have the capacity for 
noble joy and noble hatred grows from habituation”. Aristotle’s main point is that habituation 
must always preclude “argument and teaching” (Cruzer, 2002, p. 3). Therefore the student must 
be “cultivated by means of habits before teaching can be effective. Argument and teaching are 
not powerful” (Cruzer, 2002, p. 3) with people unless proper habits are inculcated first. They 
must be there already. It may seem strange to us that in these two passages Aristotle is saying 
that the learner or student must come to be able to identify a virtuous act; as well as have a desire 
to perform it out or habit. Then and only then may he learn anything about nobility. 
 So it would seem that a stage of what Aristotle calls moral development is when we 
figure out all on our own, why it is necessary to perform a virtuous act for its own sake. This 
should, according to Aristotle, be considered the act that is an end in itself (not just a means).  It 
becomes noble and just. This allows you to make a judgment all your own. Thus the beginnings 
of integrity are born. The reason is simple and that is because it is once again virtuous, not 
customary, but expected of oneself. Thus one could make the argument that virtue is a very 
important part of integrity and is the crux of my argument. 
 In the remaining chapters of this thesis, I will expand upon this conception of virtue and 
its relation both to integrity, selflessness and happiness. 
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CHAPTER 2: SELFLESSNESS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the idea of selflessness is introduced through a critical examination of 
utilitarianism.  I argue that benevolence and humility as a way of life are the key ingredients of 
selflessness and they are vital to both happiness and integrity.  
 
UTILITARIANISM 
The founders of Utilitarianism were Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-
1873), who between them shaped both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of British thought 
in many areas of discourse, but most especially ethics, philosophy and even epistemology.  
Bentham himself was considered a political radical, although today he is better known for his 
moral views.  The view that gets the most notice is his principle of Utilitarianism.  This 
philosophy considers actions based on their consequences.  The consequences that matter are, in 
fact, the overall happiness that is created for everyone affected by the action.  His ethical theories 
were grounded in a type of empiricist view of human nature.  This was influenced by thinkers of 
the enlightenment period like John Locke and David Hume.  Bentham’s theory was that what 
ultimately motivates human beings is either pleasure or pain.  In Bentham’s account, happiness 
can only be a matter of experiencing pleasure alongside lack of pain.   
 
‘Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.  It is for them alone to point 
out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. 
On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the 
chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne.  They 
govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort 
we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to 
demonstrate and confirm’. (Bentham, 2007, Ch. 1) 
  
 One feature of utilitarianism of note is that integrity or ethical behavior can be understood 
free from religious or even traditional connections.  One type of utilitarianism is called act-
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utilitarianism, so named by R.B. Brandt.  Act utilitarianism takes the view that the rightness or 
the wrongness of an action only depends on the consequences, meaning the effect of that action 
on the welfare of all human beings, or even sentient beings. 
Most utilitarians realize that their ultimate appeal must come from a type of attitude they 
might have in common with other people. The direct type of sentiment to which they might 
appeal is a general feeling of benevolence.  This is a type of attitude of seeking happiness or at 
least good consequences for all of humanity and, for some utilitarians, all sentient beings.  
Perhaps, the utilitarian’s audience may not totally agree with all his positions; however, they are 
bound to be somewhat impressed by his expressions of goodwill. 
Most people tend to favor an approach in which they obey a set of rules of some 
traditional moral system in which they were brought up.  Still the utilitarian hopes he may 
persuade his audience to agree with his system of normative ethics.  Because she is a utilitarian, 
she hopes to appeal to their sentiment of general benevolence.   This is quite sure to be present in 
any group that is willing to discuss ethical questions.  She may even try to convince some people 
that their previous attitudes about not being able to accept utilitarian ideas and concepts were 
only due to conceptual confusions.  However, she will not be able to convince everybody. 
Jack Smart observes that “It may well be that there is no ethical system which appeals to 
all people, or even to the same person in different moods” (1973, p. 7).  Nonetheless, can ethics 
or ethical behavior be tied to integrity?  Does this equate to happiness? Does this lead to 
selflessness? Is Happiness an inside job?  These are just some of the questions we will attempt to 
answer. In this chapter, however, my aim is to examine the connection between selflessness and 
integrity. Utilitarianism represents one possible model of selflessness. Our first question is 
whether this model is satisfactory. 
Let us set the contrast to two types of Utilitarianism; act utilitarianism, and rule 
utilitarianism.  Act Utilitarianism takes the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to 
be determined by consequences, good or bad, of that action itself.  On the other hand, rule 
utilitarians take the viewpoint that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be determined by 
the goodness and badness of the consequences of a rule.  In view of that rule everyone should 
perform the same action in like circumstances.   
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With the former, one gets a view like that of S.E. Toulmin and 
with the latter, one like Kant’s.  That is, if it is permissible to 
interpret Kant’s principle ‘Act only on that maxim through which 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law’ as ‘Act only on that maxim, which you as a humane and 
benevolent person would like to see established as a universal law’ 
(Smart & Williams, 1973, p.9).   
 
Of course Kant might have resisted this appeal to human feelings, but Smart calls this 
Kantian rule-utilitarianism in Kant’s honour. The whole reason a rule-utilitarian tries to advocate 
his ideas and principles is because he is fervently concerned with human happiness. Some think 
it collapses under its own weight into a type of act utilitarianism.  David Lyons gives the 
example, when he quotes an exception to a rule R, which produces the best possible outcome.  
After this happens, evidence reviewed, the rule R should be modified, thus allowing the 
exception.  This gives us a new rule.  Therefore, we now have a new set of rules to do R except it 
is in the case of C.  That is, whatever might lead the act-utilitarian to break the rule would lead 
the Kantian rule-utilitarian to modify the rule.  This would then make a rule-utilitarian equal to 
an act-utilitarian (Smart and Williams, 1965, p. 11). 
Lyons’ argument depends upon a particular interpretation of what counts as a rule. Rules 
according to the rule-utilitarian are things that an ordinary person could understand and apply. 
But Lyons’ rules would involve so many exceptions that no person could abide by them.  
Of course, both sorts of utilitarian talk about the rightness and wrongness of our actions. 
What kind of effect may they have on how real people understand their ethics?  The question 
remains are the rightness and wrongness of actions enough?  As human beings we need to aim as 
far as possible to overcome those defects of character that stand in the way of humanity’s 
flourishing.  Although one will never reach perfection in this life, this cannot be an excuse for 
not trying to become the very best example of a human being. Utilitarian principles may help, 
but since they are devoted to acts alone, or the rules that govern them, they cannot fully do 
justice to our ethical thoughts. 
One must always remember that many people have only seen and heard less than ideal 
perplexities of humanity.  Perhaps, the human happiness they see in a person can help them out 
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of a pit of despair.  Of the many people one comes in contact with daily, one never knows where 
that person is at in their life’s journey or how one’s help might affect them now or later.  So, if 
one has trouble making a decision in light of what we have learned of the utilitarian position, 
then we have missed the mark when appealing to normative ethics. The best one can do to make 
other’s lives better is to live according to your own ideal of doing the next right thing; one’s own 
happiness and ethical success can be an example to others. We do not control or fully understand 
the consequences of our actions and it is a mistake to think that we ought to. 
Most people have feelings of benevolence and sound moral thinking along with reason.  
If a man is irrational about morals he must also be irrational about probabilities for the future.  
This may cloud his decision making abilities which will abruptly affect his happiness and that of 
others around him.  The greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people is, 
roughly, the goal of utilitarianism.  This is all to the good.  However, if every person worked 
every minute of every day to maximize happiness, they would have no life of their own.  If in 
thought, word and deed a person tries to the very best of their ability in a selfless way to put 
other people first, and themselves last in moderation, they will be accomplishing the paradoxical 
idea underlying utilitarianism. But the idea of combining moderation with selflessness needs 
careful explication. In “Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View”, David Brink argues 
that utilitarian theory can accommodate the idea that the best outcomes are to be obtained by 
allowing people to give their own projects in live a special priority. However, this raises the 
question of how to bring together an ideal of selflessness with a version of utilitarianism that 
returns emphasis to actions that prioritize our own projects. I will describe an account of 
selflessness that does this in the next section. 
 Utilitarianism is a very important philosophical position. However, I propose a modified 
version.  By adding selflessness to the formula, we are not just looking for what is in it for us, 
but what we may do for others.  This will propel the version I propose, forward.  There are those 
who will rely on the demandingness objection.  Some moral theories are considered to be too 
demanding to follow. The demandingness objection relies on the idea that a moral theory has 
principles within its standard that for all intents and purposes are too demanding. Utilitarianism 
is often claimed to be such a theory. (See Scheffler 1994, chapter 3.)  
Let us take the case of a society in which we do not find any type of extreme situations.  
In that society some people may adopt a utilitarian or close to utilitarian thought process, but 
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many cannot.  One could consider it might be better to provide our support behind the prevailing 
morality, instead of seeking to change it with the risk of the weakening respect for human 
aspiration.  As Sidgwick said: 
 
The doctrine that Universal Happiness as the ultimate standard 
must not be understood to imply that Universal Benevolence 
is…always the best motive of action.  For…it is not necessary that 
the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the 
end at which we consciously aim: and if experience shows that the 
general happiness will be more satisfactorily attained if men 
frequently act from other motives than pure universal philanthropy, 
it is obvious that these other motives are to be preferred on 
Utilitarian principles (quoted in Smart & Williams, 1973, p. 51). 
 
Smart says that it is dangerous to influence a person in opposition to whatever his 
convictions of what is right may be.  The possibility exists that more harm may be done in 
altering his regard for duty, than would be saved by preventing the particular action.  (Smart and 
Williams, 1973, p. 51) Quoting Sidgwick again, “any particular existing moral rule, though not 
ideally best even for such beings as existing men under the existing circumstances, may yet be 
the best that they can be got to obey” (Sidgwick, as cited in Smart & Williams, 1973, p. 51,52). 
Therefore, it might be useful to advance a moderate form of selflessness, even and 
although this is not a pure form of benevolence.  Moderate selflessness means putting others in 
one’s life ahead of oneself. Paradoxically, this is not a self-sacrificial attitude. The utilitarian 
concept of selflessness puts everyone on an equal footing. Nobody is more important than 
anyone else. This is both too demanding a standard and too inhuman. This treatment of oneself 
as neither no more nor less important than anyone is a wonderful idea in theory. But it is not a 
good way of living an ethical life. Ethical theories have to meet the test of everyday life. Is this 
something that one can live by and live with? 
Jack Smart takes a different point viewpoint.  He discusses Kurt Baier’s view that act-
utilitarianism must be rejected because it says we should never relax, we should use all our time 
for good works. Smart argues that the utilitarian has but two replies. One is that what most 
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people surmise as ordinary is false.  Second, a rational type of investigation might lead us to 
conclude that we could just relax less than we do. The third possibility or reply is that act-
utilitarian ideas do not provide any premises that show we should never relax.  Perhaps relaxing 
and doing a few good works each day increases threefold our capacity to do good works 
tomorrow. (Smart & Williams, 1973, p. 55) 
I think Smart overstates the possibility that act-utilitarianism is compatible with a life lived well. 
What is important here is that we live lives that are good for others, both as examples and fellow 
citizens; that we become important parts of others’ lives and that we become a benevolent force 
in their lives. Treating all our actions as just opportunities to maximize utility misses this.  
I argue for a moderate sense of utilitarianism that falls under a type of middle ground. 
With this in mind, one might be able to achieve the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest 
amount of people, always with an eye toward integrity and selflessness. This may influence the 
most amount of people’s lives and help them be richly filled with both purpose and meaning.  At 
the same time because of the selflessness factor they will not want to hold this treasure to 
themselves. 
Williams makes the claim that utilitarianism’s demands are just too impartial therefore no 
personal integrity can be had by the utilitarian.  He makes his case against utilitarianism into a 
dilemma for any clear-cut utilitarian.  He uses the example of a man named Jim who happens 
upon a small South American village.  Suddenly, he spots twenty or so Indians lined up against a 
wall about to be shot.  A heavy captain in a khaki shirt is in charge. After questioning Jim, he 
says he is willing to declare Jim an honoured visitor from another land.  Then and only then, 
after Jim kills one Indian will the others be let off, the making of a special occasion.  Of course, 
if Jim refuses, then there is no special occasion, and all the Indians will be killed. (Smart and 
Williams, 1973, p. 98) 
One of the special features of Utilitarianism is that it does not take into consideration 
when some cases should take feelings into account; for example, the fact that each one of us is 
especially responsible for what he or she does instead of what other people do. This cardinal 
principle and idea is very closely related to integrity as well as selflessness.  We care for other 
people; we must do this to follow the intent of our principles. 
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SELFLESSNESS 
There are three different descriptions of selflessness in respect to utilitarianism and one’s own 
happiness that I want to consider.   
 
• Description A: Every act is right and proper only if one considers other people’s 
happiness as important as one’s own. 
• Description B: Selflessness is to treat one’s own happiness as less important than 
the happiness of other people in one’s life.   
• Description C: Selflessness is to treat your own happiness as not important at all. 
  
And so out of these three descriptions of selflessness I need to find the proper description that 
fits my philosophical purpose. The most obvious answer comes under description B, because this 
description takes oneself out of the picture, relieves one of the bondage of self-centered thinking 
and behavior. This type of thinking philosophically takes oneself into another dimension of 
existence, whereby what one has or has not is not so important. However, it is what one gives 
away in this manner of selfless giving that encourages integrity both in the giver and the 
receiver. It encourages the integrity of the receiver because it inspires them to live with 
selflessness also. 
 Description A is the utilitarian perspective. This flattens our moral world. It treats 
everyone the same, in principle. No person is made to feel special. As I argued in the previous 
section, this is not a satisfactory way of thinking about our moral relationships with others. 
Description C, on the other hand, encourages dishonesty. To think this way requires us to deny 
our own basic wishes and to treat our own happiness as not important at all. 
What does my concept of selflessness mean, as specified in description B above? It 
means regarding your life as a gift to others. That gift is given to the receiver without any 
thought of return.  This by its very nature becomes the art of selfless giving. And when 
selflessness and giving are seen in this light, all sorts of things are apt to happen. Newfound 
projects may emerge; our thought processes may be kindled anew. All sorts of projects that can 
be nothing but beneficial to humanity’s imagination will be sparked. This is not to say that the 
other two types of selflessness do not have a place and perhaps even a time in our world, one 
must not entirely discount them. However, description B describes the idea of selflessness that 
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allows integrity, selflessness and happiness to steer the good life in a way that can be seen and 
heard by others. 
What is the relationship between integrity and selflessness when it comes to artists? An 
artist who is committed to realizing their own personal vision of artistic excellence seems like 
someone who lacks selflessness and yet possesses integrity. I argue that an artist ought to create 
art for the good of others primarily, for their enjoyment as well as hers. Therefore, an artist can 
have selflessness and a passionate commitment to artistic excellence. Selflessness isn’t a matter 
of always prying into the affairs of others and trying to be helpful to them. It is a matter of 
valuing your projects primarily because they are valuable to others. 
  
HAPPINESS 
And so what of happiness?  Is it just a byproduct of the right kind of living as I have suggested? 
The right kind of living is a triangular way of life.  This triangle consists of a selfless way of life 
and integrity. These are two aspects of a virtuous life that leads to something called inner 
happiness, a happiness the things of this world can neither give nor take away.  This happiness is 
an inner peace, a feeling that all is right with oneself and one’s humanity. My view of the 
relationship between happiness and living a morally good life contrasts with Kant’s. Kant writes 
in The Critique of Practical Reason: “But this distinction of the principle of happiness from that 
of morality is not for this reason an opposition between them, and pure practical reason does not 
require that we should renounce the claims to happiness; it requires that we take no account of 
them whenever duty is in question” (Arrington, p. 289).   
Kant’s view is that when there is a choice between duty and happiness the moral 
obligation for mankind is always duty.  This duty is to do the right thing in all circumstances.  
When one does this often happiness will result, but not always.  In any case, we would pursue it 
certainly as rational persons.  “To be happy is necessarily the desire of every rational but finite 
being” (Arrington, p. 289-90). 
According to Kant, we must believe in or postulate in God and immortality in order to 
have faith in morality, or to do the next right thing. Duty first, happiness second; but God and 
immortality ensure that duty and happiness will eventually reconcile. Arrington describes Kant’s 
position in the following way. 
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‘In his critique of Practical Reason, Kant gives us a theory of the 
Summum bonum, the highest or most perfect good.  The highest 
good consists of two parts: Morality or virtue is the first, happiness 
is the second.  Virtue is the required condition for anything being 
good or desirable, but this does not prove that virtue is the “entire 
and perfect good” – rather, “for this, happiness is also required” 
(Critique of Practical Reason, 116,110).  Accordingly, Kant 
describes the highest good as happiness in proportion to worth, or 
happiness in accord with virtue.  The most perfect, complete state 
of affairs that could exist in the world of finite beings would be 
one in which human beings are happy to the degree that they 
deserve to be.  Conversely, a world which one was worthy of 
happiness but did not attain it, would not be a rational world.  As 
Kant puts it in the lecture on ethics, “The highest created good is 
the most perfect world, that is, a world in which all rational beings 
are happy and are worthy of happiness (Lectures on Ethics, 6)” 
(Arrington, p. 290) 
 
I think that Kant is right about the highest good, but wrong about the need for this 
postulate of God and immortality. Living a good life is our best way of achieving happiness right 
here and now. We should not rely upon God alone to ensure our happiness when we can secure it 
on our own. We are responsible for our own happiness, as we are responsible for our own virtue. 
The ideals of selflessness and integrity are a timeless starting point for this task.  There is 
a big difference between contentment and pure happiness, especially from the inside of a 
person’s being. To be contented is merely to be without complaint and dissatisfaction. To be 
happy is to be joyful. This joy does not come out of merely doing one’s duty, but through 
selflessness.  
Are there counterexamples to the relationship between selflessness and happiness? For 
example, overly burdened and sometimes exhausted family caregivers, along with those (often 
women) who seriously neglect their own welfare in devoting themselves fully to their partner’s 
best interest? This could easily be the case for any caregiver who not only works but also devotes 
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herself to a modern household. A modern home with children and a demanding husband could 
tax anyone. Although these caregivers are sometimes exhausted, they would tell you that they 
would not trade their happiness back for the most exhausting moments. And we could say the 
same thing about people who work in refugee camps, food banks or soup kitchens and homeless 
shelters. Selflessness, as I understand, is not the abandonment and neglect of the self. It is a 
matter of prioritizing others in one’s life. What is most of value to a selfless person is the good 
that they do for others; and this is generally reflected back to them. To succeed in living with 
both integrity and selflessness requires one to take care of oneself as well as others. If you take 
care of yourself, you can best take care of others. If a person is depressed or miserable, because 
of their attempts to help others, they are not succeeding in being truly selfless.   
Consider an everyday, concrete example of the relationship between selflessness and 
happiness. One such example might be a golf caddy who selflessly goes all over the golf course 
to carry clubs for others.  He has a love for the game.  He keeps score.  He has learned many 
things about the game. He may never even play the game but yet he shows up time and time 
again, all season. He has no membership, gets paid very little. He loves the natural beauty and 
surroundings of the course, and it is near to where he lives.  He knows his job requires humility 
but he doesn’t mind.  He doesn’t even know what his final purpose may be yet he continues day 
after day.  He believes one day his purpose will be revealed.  In the meantime he has that 
enduring joy and peace because it is not about him, his little plans and desires.  Happiness has 
found him.   
Another counterexample would be a person who has suffered the loss of a loved one. 
Wouldn’t the attendant grief rule out the serenity and peace of happiness no matter how 
selflessly the person lives? My view is that integrity and selflessness added together give us our 
best chance at a live of happiness. It doesn’t follow from this that we cannot feel grief and 
misery at the loss of a loved one. Becoming selfish in the face of grief will not make us happier 
in the face of grief. Losing one’s principles would perhaps become another source of grief. 
The relationship between my own pursuit of happiness and my faith in a benevolent 
creator should be based on humility rather than need. I should be humble in the face of the world, 
not demanding of it. One may believe that whatever the future holds it must hold more good than 
evil. Surely, a benevolent creator of any sort would wish it so. But this thought ought not to be 
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the basis of any relationship a person has to faith in God. We ought not to believe in God, if we 
do, simply because God guarantees us the highest good.  
If we as humans are to leave the fragility of life as we have been living it, each day must 
be a day to carry a vision that enables us to take our next steps towards integrity and selflessness.  
Once self-centeredness has been turned out of our lives, we will feel as if we have been propelled 
into a new way of experiencing our life.  Our principles and cornerstones now in place, I feel we 
need not apologize for either integrity or selflessness; two ideals worth working towards. 
Therefore, by staying in the solution of active integrity and selflessness, which in turn creates 
happiness and daily gratitude for blessings received, as well as a better life, we have arrived at a 
formula for better living. 
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CHAPTER 3: MACINTYRE ON FLOURISHING 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2, I argued that the highest forms of human happiness require selflessness, understood 
as a disposition to put others in our lives first. In the chapter, I turn to the work of Alasdair 
MacIntyre in order to defend this claim. In his book Dependent Rational Animals (1999), 
MacIntyre develops an account of human flourishing that acknowledges the inevitability of our 
dependence on each other. This is the basis for my claim that genuine human happiness can only 
be achieved through living a virtuous and selfless life. Integrity is the key virtue, but other 
virtues are important too.  
Throughout his book, MacIntyre again and again shows how we, as humans, cannot 
afford the luxury of the lone wolf syndrome as exemplified by the life and thought of Frederick 
Nietzsche. We are social animals, but also rational; we require benevolence in order to flourish. 
MacIntyre begins with the concept of flourishing. He notes that flourishing is a species-
dependent quality. It exists “qua humans, qua monkeys, qua animals, qua dolphins, or even qua 
plants” (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 64). When he talks of human flourishing, MacIntyre means to 
flourish in virtue or goodness. 
What in itself is good? When we make judgments about others or even other 
communities and what is best for all of these, according to MacIntyre, we must look at human 
flourishing. An example could be Michelangelo and the Sistine Chapel. Millions of people have 
seen it and have gained inspiration from his frescoes. The frescoes are a good in themselves, 
because they are an inspirational achievement in the arts. In a similar way, human flourishing is a 
good in itself. (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 67) says: 
We therefore need to distinguish between what it is that makes 
certain goods good and goods to be valued for their own sake from 
what it is that makes it good for this particular individual or this 
particular society in this particular situation to make them objects 
of her or his or their effective practical regard. And our judgments 
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about how it is best for an individual or a community to order the 
goods in their lives exemplify this third type of ascription, one 
whereby we judge unconditionally about what it is best for 
individuals or groups to be or do or have not only qua agents 
engaged in this or that form of activity in this or that role or roles, 
but also qua human beings. It is these judgments that are 
judgments about human flourishing. 
Although reason, culture, and situation may all vary, the results required are all the same 
in the end: human flourishing. MacIntyre drives home this point about human flourishing and 
what causes and affects it. He seeks to establish that it is the virtues that affect not only others 
and their lives but even us and our daily lives. If he is right, and quite possibly he is, could this 
flourishing be the key to human happiness? After all, what exactly is flourishing? What did 
Aristotle or Saint Thomas Aquinas mean? Is MacIntyre giving us his update of Aristotle’s key to 
the virtues? MacIntyre claims that humans need to understand themselves in order to flourish. 
Without this conceptual understanding, no flourishing can be had. Socially flourishing 
relationships are critical to well-being. These help human reasoning and require human 
reasoning. 
Here are two examples of non-flourishing parts of society on the flip side of MacIntyre’s 
account of a flourishing human being. MacIntyre proposes that we need the virtues to form a 
communal sense of values both in us and in society. When those truths become half-realized and 
societal norms begin to break down, what happens? A vacuum forms. After this occurs, usually 
some power-driver fills the void, someone who also claims the authority of a higher order. This 
power driver, the person on the flipside of MacIntyre’s argument, who may or may not think 
they get directions straight from a higher order, bowls everything over in their path to meet the 
end goal. One could almost say they are like a hurricane roaring its way through the lives of 
others, the things in their way must be eliminated or else exploited. 
Another non-flourishing example could be that of a lead actor in a stage play. What might 
happen, when the lead actor takes control of the stage play? This same lead actor tries to arrange 
everything just perfectly to his satisfaction and in the way he sees fit. In the end, the stage play 
probably does not come off very well. All the other actors’ revolt, and chaos is the result. Our 
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lead actor, looking back, is sure if he could have just manipulated one more person, place or 
thing on that stage, the show would have come off perfectly. Everyone would have been happy 
and, best of all, he would have been the toast of the town. After all, our lead actor thinks of 
himself as perfection, leading all others down the golden path, the true answer to happiness in 
life. To his consternation, our lead actor instead finds himself marooned by the very people he 
just knew would support him as he led them, as he directed them by arranging the lights, props, 
costumes, scenery, just to let them know how good a lead actor he was. Why, he might even 
become a director one day and open a theatre company, in which they might show their 
gratitude, or should one say, servitude. Our lead actor has shown us an example of self-centered 
ego in the extreme, thinking of himself first, second and always before others. 
 MacIntyre points out in Dependent Rational Animals that even in a colony of dolphins, 
the relationships they have to each other is quite indispensable to their flourishing. Could we not 
say the same thing is true of humankind? No person is an island. We not only need the virtues to 
get along as one common community, but also as a world order, a culture, and as individual 
communities. We must decide and teach our children what kind of world we want to live in and 
leave to future generations.  
 This is what makes MacIntyre’s argument profound. He leaves no one in society out of 
his equation. He takes into account the old, the very young, the ill, the injured and the disabled. 
In his determination, virtue and common good must always be the rule. We know, for example, 
because MacIntyre points it out, or at least re-emphasizes it, that people and dolphins are similar 
in many ways. Toxic things will hurt our existence. When human reasoning is endangered, so is 
our relationship with dolphins and other mammals. Most people develop their general ideals and 
values from an early age. MacIntyre, in his writings, says this is an inescapable conclusion. He 
further concedes, as humans, we must understand ourselves, for barring this achievement, a 
human being will not flourish. This is the principal way humans are different from other 
mammals such as dolphins.  
 MacIntyre points out the signposts that make a good community. For example, he notes 
what makes good child rearing. To let a child know early in development what is good or bad for 
them is vital. What is the crucial step? He calls it becoming an independent practical reasoner. 
We need this step to make correct judgments about life, living, happiness and, of course, the very 
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heart of the matter, the flourishing of our species. In this manner we develop our capacity to 
make the leap from our earliest development and from those who taught us, such as teachers. 
Eventually, we too could make reasonable judgments about life and living and the community 
we live in, without fear or favor, always with a sense of humility for gifts received. Having these 
rudiments of virtue, according to MacIntyre’s philosophy, we now have good reasons to act in 
particular ways, rather than in others. We have become Independent Practical Reasoners. 
Although one may have experienced this way of life before reading MacIntyre’s book, it 
reinforces and cements the foundation for living life this way. 
 
A child learns to make his own way, because of the people, 
teachers and others that help make judgments for him about early 
life. This is as it should be. However, when it comes to one’s very 
own ideals about “the good that I am”, what each of us has to do, 
in order to develop our powers as independent reasoners, and so to 
flourish qua members of our species, is to make the transition from 
accepting what we are taught by those earliest teachers to making 
our own independent judgments about goods, judgments, that we 
are able to justify rationally to ourselves and to others as furnishing 
us with good reasons for acting in this way rather than that 
(MacIntyre, 1999, p. 71). 
 
 MacIntyre claims that the transition to becoming an independent practical reasoner 
involves the three dimensions, described below. This allows for a logical argument. These three 
dimensions can stand together or on their own. The first language is what makes the discovery 
possible, along with some other capabilities. MacIntyre describes the second dimension in these 
terms: 
 “The first salient aspect of this transition, as I noted earlier, is that 
it is a movement from merely having reasons to being able to 
evaluate our reasons as good or as bad reasons and by so doing to 
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change our reasons for acting; in consequence our actions” 
(MacIntyre, 1999, p. 72). 
MacIntyre earlier noted that a very early aspect of the transition is the movement from 
having only reasons for acting, to being actually able to stand back and analyze our reasons as 
either good or bad, and by so, doing change our reasons in the future for acting in consequence 
of those actions. This is the second dimension. 
 The second dimension involves cultivating a distance from our desires.  MacIntyre 
(1999) makes the claim, “to have learned how to stand back in some measure from our present 
desires, so as to be able to evaluate them, is a necessary condition for engaging in sound 
reasoning about our reasons for action” (p. 72). 
 MacIntyre offers a critical analysis of just how important it is for us in society to make 
this transition. It comes from a vision he transmits of those in society that live in the shadows. He 
makes the claim that for us, as for them, it is of crucial importance that we confront the same 
obstacles they do. MacIntyre says,  
We need others to help us avoid encountering and falling victim to 
disabling conditions, but when, often inescapably, we do fall 
victim, either temporarily or permanently, to such conditions as 
those of blindness, deafness, crippling injury, debilitating disease, 
or psychological disorder, we need others to sustain us, to help us 
in obtaining needed, often scarce, resources, to help us discover 
what new ways forward there may be, and to stand in our place 
from time to time doing on our behalf what we cannot do for 
ourselves.(p. 73)  
 Many of these people have played a valuable role in our very own transition. One might 
ask the question, transition to what? The answer would be from childlike dependency to being 
engaged socially and finally being defined by the relationships one has built throughout one’s 
life. At some point, one becomes this rationally independent practical reasoner. This, however, is 
not an end in itself, because learning to cooperate with others and to persevere in human good 
makes those same relationships and societies flourish at any level. Understanding their good is 
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necessary to the understanding of the present time as well as the future. This movement that 
takes us from an awareness of only the present to some awareness of an imagined future, is the 
third dimension. 
 Of his account of the transition from childhood to becoming an independent practical 
reasoner, MacIntyre (p. 74) says, “This too, like the ability to evaluate our reasons for action and 
the ability to distance ourselves from our present desires, is an ability that requires both 
possession of language and the capacity to put language to a wide range of different uses”. 
 Non-human animals by contrast lack the capacity for language and imagining possible 
futures. Wittgenstein takes it even further: “One can imagine an animal (tiger) angry, frightened, 
unhappy, happy, and startled. But hopeful? And why not?” And he goes on to point out that a 
dog may believe that its master is at the door but not that he will come the day after tomorrow. 
(Philosophical Investigations II, I, 174) 
 Children do not develop into adults by themselves. Their development into independent 
practical reasoners requires social cooperation. To be an independent practical reasoner requires 
being part of a cooperative social community, one that can deliberate about an imagined future.  
MacIntyre states (p. 74), 
Independent practical reasoners contribute to the formation and 
sustaining of their social relationships, as infants do not, and to 
learn how to become an independent practical reasoner is to learn 
how to cooperate with others in forming and sustaining those same 
relationships that make possible the achievement of common 
goods by independent practical reasoners. Such cooperative 
activities presuppose some degree of shared understanding of 
present and future possibilities”.  
 One must remember that along with positive present and future possibilities, there is 
another side of life worthy of one’s imagination. Many around us, some near, perhaps others far 
away, suffer from assorted ranges of horrendous handicaps and illnesses. These can run the 
gamut from the deformed infant, the blind, the deaf, and the loss of limbs to many other forms of 
disability. Many of these people see a narrow view of the world ahead for themselves. This has 
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often been treated as a matter of fact in society. However, there is a way for these obstacles to be 
overcome. It has a threefold answer. Firstly the disabled or impoverished must help themselves 
as a first part of the answer. Secondly, others must contribute to the wellbeing of these groups. 
Usually one gets tenfold back what one gives away. Thirdly, another reason, according to 
MacIntyre, is “Others too may become the victims of an inability to imagine alternative realistic 
futures, because in some crucial stages of early life they were not provided with enough of an 
education in imagining alternative possibilities” (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 75). So the third part of the 
answer is education about the possibilities of life. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GOOD LIFE 
What happens if a person’s early childhood experiences are stifled? Perhaps the home life is a 
battlefield; then what? These defective relations can and do often follow children right into 
adulthood. The child’s, and later adolescents, creative, mental, and physical sense of self, as well 
as any kind of independence in the faculty of reasoning, can be challenged. 
MacIntyre discusses Bernard Williams’ account of internal reasons to illuminate the 
difficulty of moving from childhood to adulthood. 
Williams has argued that there can be no such thing as a reason for 
action by a particular agent which is external to and independent of 
the members of this agent’s motivational set, but he is careful to 
point out that we should not think that set as “statically given” 
(Williams, 1981, p. 105). So Williams certainly allows that an 
agent may come to be moved by considerations which do not at 
present move her or him; what had been an external reason may 
become an internal reason. But what Williams’s conclusion does 
exclude is the possibility that it may be true of some particular 
agent that it would be good and best for her or him, qua human 
being or qua aunt or qua farmer to do such and such, and therefore 
she or he has good reason to do such and such, independently of 
whether or not any at present or future time that agent will have, 
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perhaps even could have, given her or his individual 
circumstances, the requisite motivation (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 86). 
 MacIntyre continues his discussion: 
William’s account certainly allows for moral development of some 
kinds, but it obscures from view the way in which agents have to 
learn at various stages how to transcend what have been up till this 
or that point the limitations of their motivational set and will fail 
badly in their moral development, if they remain within those 
limitations (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 87). 
Exactly how does this change, this transformation of a child’s motivational set, occur? 
Sometimes, under the correct type of circumstances like the ones MacIntyre describes, it seems 
to happen naturally, like the ebb and flow of the sea. However, in other cases nothing but the 
most stringent work on a human being unaware of the virtues, or just plain belligerent towards 
any such terms, can bring about the much desired result. Some people really do exalt in their 
defects of character, especially those glorified in movies and on television.   
Can it be by accident that MacIntyre uses the word moral, twice, within a very short 
space? Perhaps one should then start to take a look at what qualities are best for a child to 
develop in the first place. What changes, new directions and eventually inclinations may propel a 
child towards getting through the seasons of life? Nothing in human life exists in a vacuum. If 
nothing changes, nothing changes. Much help is needed to survive the rigors of everyday life. 
 When we think about people who have become temperate, how is it that they have come 
to enjoy moderation? Were they born into moderation as a child or was there a degree of self-
centeredness? Indeed, is there a degree of self-centeredness in all of us? So are the virtues 
MacIntyre continues to speak of necessarily learned traits. What about people in society who live 
in the excesses of gluttony, sloth, pride, greed, lust, anger and envy: the seven deadly sins? These 
traits can asphyxiate any degree of agreeable attitude one may try to carry out into the world. It is 
only when the virtues are applied to these self-indulgent character defects, that one can live a 
worthwhile life as an independent practical reasoner. One is reminded that such individuals are 
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fortunate. Some never recover from the tormented lives they lead. However, some people do 
make remarkable progress if they are willing to take a chance on changing.  
 For those who somehow make it through the early educational help with the virtues 
MacIntyre refers to, the picture is completely different. 
Someone who has become temperate will have come to enjoy 
moderation and to find excess disagreeable and even painful. She 
or he will no longer practice moderation in spite of a desire for the 
pleasures that belong to excess, but because desire itself has been 
transformed. What she or he finds agreeable and useful is no 
longer the same, and temperateness itself will now have become 
agreeable and will not be recognized as useful. The class of 
virtues, that is to say, includes some virtues at least, such as 
temperateness, that are agreeable to and are recognized as useful 
by those who possess them, but that may well seem disagreeable 
and even harmful not only to those with the corresponding vices, 
but also to those whose purposes are such that it is useful to them 
that others should have those vices. So it is highly agreeable and 
useful to those who market certain kinds of consumer goods that 
there should be intemperate consumers. Their own vice of 
acquisitiveness make the vice of intemperateness in others 
agreeable and useful to them (p. 88). 
To acquire a virtue is often to change the sorts of things one desires and this change will not 
necessarily be welcomed by others or even by one’s past self. 
Why is it that MacIntyre continues to make the assertion in his dissertation of how 
important education and the role of parents, community and others are? He keeps subdividing the 
roles and what part they play. For example, he cites that especially mothers provide first a secure 
home and constant approval. It must be the correct kind of approval and not abuse. Then the 
other part of the division of parenting is unconditional love. This just means that, no matter what 
happens in your life, your parent will be there for you. Lastly, the parents, but especially 
mothers, will make the child’s needs predominant in their life, ahead of her own needs.  
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Even before a child is born, parents may say all they really want is a healthy child. What 
they really mean most of the time is that they are hoping their child doesn’t get struck down with 
some crippling disease, doesn’t end up with mental difficulties, sickly development, or any 
number of childhood illnesses that could strike. However, the commitment to children holds 
whether extremely healthy or brain damaged. As MacIntyre says: 
The parents of children who are in fact severely disabled, do of 
course, sometimes need to be heroic in their exercise of the 
relevant virtues, as the parents of ordinary children do not. They 
have one of the most demanding kinds of work that there is. But it 
is the parents of the severely disabled who are the paradigm of 
good motherhood and fatherhood as such, who provide the model 
for the key to the work of all parents (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 91).   
I think that MacIntyre is arguing for the importance of selflessness. The integrity of parents 
resides in the selflessness they show to their children in any matter. The ideal of a good parent is 
one that puts children first. Parents of disabled children show the extreme example of this virtue. 
 
FLOURISHING, SELF-KNOWLEDGE, AND INTEGRITY 
At some point, children, adolescents, even adults learn some sort of usage of the word ‘good’ 
and its alternatives. If they fail to learn a satisfactory use of the concept ‘good’, they may fail to 
learn what is genuinely valuable for them. Even this may have a positive educative value for 
them unless failure is deeply and irreversibly vicious. Having a general knowledge of the virtues 
early in life and now having failed to achieve something valued, one has the opportunity to 
reflect on one’s history and reconsider what is good in one’s life.  
For the greater part of our knowledge of the natural and social 
world we of course have to rely upon what others – the majority of 
them others of whom we have no first-hand knowledge - 
communicated to us, in order to supplement the meagerness of our 
individual experience. But our self-knowledge too depends in key 
part upon what we learn about ourselves from others, and more 
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than this, upon a confirmation of our own judgments and ourselves 
by others who know us well, a confirmation that only such others 
can provide. (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 94) 
 I cannot truly know myself alone. This mirror effect of human identity is emphasized by 
numerous philosophers including Wittgenstein. In fact, the only reason I truly know what and 
who I might be is because there are other people who know who and what I am as a human 
being. 
 In fact, in almost all human affairs, self-knowledge alone will not fix one’s problems. 
However, when the virtues are applied, it is a different matter altogether. There is one virtue that 
is irreplaceable when it comes to finding a degree of resisting self-deception. It is, quite simply, 
lucid appreciation of the truth about oneself.  
Honesty to both oneself and others requires constant self-examination and being 
accountable for one’s actions. We need this part of the formula, in other words integrity, to 
become independent practical reasoners.  
 Let it be noted, however, that we always will continue to need others for the rest of our 
lives. After all, look at a family of dolphins or even gorillas. Neither species lives alone, but in 
groups. If we look at a flock of sheep wandering along a hillside, they seem to get along fine. It 
is only when one strays away from the flock that the wolves close in. Why is it so important for 
our moral lives that we live well together in groups? MacIntyre sees this in terms of our ability to 
avoid serious errors. 
We may at any point go astray in our practical reasoning because 
of intellectual error: perhaps we happen to be insufficiently well-
informed about the particulars of our situation; or we have gone 
beyond the evidence in a way that has misled us; or we have relied 
too heavily on some unsubstantiated generalization. But we may 
also go astray because of moral error: we have been over-
influenced by our dislike of someone; we have projected on to a 
situation some phantasy in whose grip we are; we are insufficiently 
sensitive to someone else’s suffering. And our intellectual errors 
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are often, although not always, rooted in our moral errors. From 
both types of mistake the best protections are friendship and 
collegiality (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 97).  
 As we become better independent practical reasoners, we develop our character one step 
at a time for the better, using the virtues as our guide and thus becoming better able to judge the 
character in others. MacIntyre (1999) claims that, “When we are unable to rely on coworkers and 
friends, then our confidence in our own judgments may always become a source of illusion” (p. 
97). 
 Why would it be that any source of illusion, when it comes to our judgments about life 
and living, ever enters our life? A house is only as strong as its foundation. Just as a house needs 
a strong foundation to withstand the storms that may test its strength, so people need a secure 
foundation for their confidence in their own judgments. Most children imitate from a very early 
age nearly every action and reaction their parent’s model for them. So it goes, if one grows up 
with a faulty foundation, there is only one solution. That foundation must be torn asunder and 
rebuilt upon firm bedrock. This can and is done, even in the most severe cases. So what is the 
key? Many of the solutions are described in MacIntyre’s book, but they probably could have 
been found in a lot of philosophy books. For example, MacIntyre says respect for truth is a 
central part of his list of virtues. Let us add one: the idea of keeping an open mind. Many people 
close their minds when it comes to new ideas, even if life is crumbling in around them. They 
would much prefer going back to familiar territory or a date with the undertaker. A closed mind 
is one of many ways in which humans are dangerous to each other. 
 MacIntyre (1999, p. 97) remarks: 
There is no point in our development towards and in our exercise 
of independent practical reasoning at which we cease altogether to 
be dependent on particular others. But of course it may always 
happen that those on whom we depend may lack the virtues 
necessary for developing or sustaining our practical reasoning and 
so by neglect, by well-intended, but harmful misdirection, by 
manipulation or exploitation or victimization, may fail to prevent 
otherwise avoidable disability, even on occasion intentionally, and 
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so of defective development. (I am not losing sight of the fact that 
much disability is unavoidable.) Dolphins do not have reason to 
fear dolphins, as humans have reason to fear humans. 
 To get to a place where the kind of ordered social relationships that MacIntyre refers to 
comes into one’s life fully, one will need adequate practical reasoning and development of a 
range of virtues. Usually we have been given much of what we need in life. We have been given 
this gift of becoming independent practical reasoners and we now find ourselves in the position 
of giving back to others what, at one time, we so desperately needed ourselves.  
 Most people are capable of being highly self-centered. The philosopher Thomas Hobbes 
even coined a few words to describe what life would be like in a world where individual egos 
reigned supreme; the self would run riot. Hobbes said that in a state of nature, a state in which 
human behavior is not controlled by governing forces, human life is “solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short” (The Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes, 1660, Ch. XIII, XIV). However, it is the 
networks of relationships one finds oneself in that makes the change from a dangerous state of 
nature to a human community.  
 MacIntyre’s view on Page 108,109 is: 
When a network of such familial, neighborhood, and craft 
relationship is in a flourishing state, when, that is, there is a 
flourishing local community, it will always be because those 
activities of the members of that community that aim at their 
common good are informed by their practical rationality. But those 
who benefit from that communal flourishing will include those 
least capable of independent practical reasoning, the very young 
and the very old, the sick, the injured, and the otherwise disabled, 
and their individual flourishing will be an important index of the 
flourishing of the whole community. For it is insofar as it is need 
that provides reasons for action for the members of some particular 
community that that community flourishes. 
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 It is here where MacIntyre takes his stand about the fact that a flourishing community, a 
community that evades Hobbes’ nightmare, must be one in which the most needful are cared for. 
Since every person is needful and dependent at particular points in their life, perhaps at many 
points, this completes the circle of caring.   
 There is another circle that characterizes a flourishing community. It is the circle of 
accountability. A person must be accountable to others at the same time that others are 
accountable to them. And a person must always be accountable to themselves. A community of 
independent practical reasoners will be one in which people in general accept the burden of 
accountability, both to themselves and to others. MacIntyre puts the point this way on page 105: 
By independence I mean both the ability and willingness to 
evaluate the reasons for action advanced to one by others, so that 
one makes oneself accountable for one’s endorsements of the 
practical conclusions of others as well as for one’s own 
conclusions. One cannot then be an independent practical reasoner 
without being able to give to others an intelligible account of one’s 
reasoning.  
 MacIntyre says with good reason that this account need not be theoretical in any 
substantial sense. He uses a very simple age old formula that takes into account how humans 
gain independence of spirit. He cites willingness as a key ingredient for a person of action. He 
then furthers all of these conclusions by showing how this formula makes us accountable to 
others and ourselves. The business of being accountable to others is not just a theory one can 
articulate or espouse, it is something one must live. In order to become this independent practical 
reasoner, we will need all parts of the formula: enthusiasm, tolerance, and of course, honesty.  
 Let me summarize my use of MacIntyre in this thesis. I argue that study of dependent 
rational animals ties in well with my overall argument.  He details how children, through 
practices of child rearing by their parents and community can learn starting at an early age to 
reason and later in time to become an independent practical reasoner.  He describes throughout 
his book how the family unit and the community are essential to the formation of independent 
practical reasoners. This process is meant to work in several ways according to MacIntyre’s 
formulation. He talks of the importance of parental love and how it is an unconditional love, 
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never abuse of any kind.  Parents almost by necessity put the child’s needs above and ahead of 
their own. In any case they will go to great lengths to guard, defend and love this child and 
selflessly help them become adults.  
 However MacIntyre takes care never to leave anyone out of his considerations. He speaks 
of children who are extremely disabled, their parents sometimes need to go to much further 
lengths in the exercise of the relevant virtues. These would perhaps be heroic in nature. I am thus 
in agreement with many, if not all of the arguments of his book. Let us look at a number of them.  
Consider selflessness. MacIntyre demonstrates through his examples of the parents and the 
communal examples of disabled children, the very old, the sick, the injured, the otherwise greatly 
disenfranchised and even the very young, his index of flourishing. Through MacIntyre’s 
examples of flourishing one can see how he sees the development of character as paramount 
using the virtues and selflessness as one’s guide. 
 Every person at some point in their lives become needful and dependent, and at that time 
they will therefore they will open the possibility of completing the circle of caring. This further 
completes the community’s circle of caring, in which one generation cares of another, to be 
cared for by that other in turn. There is also what MacIntyre refers to as a circle of 
accountability: the ways in which we must simply be accountable to others and ourselves. As 
MacIntyre constantly alludes to, we must live in at least a minimally virtuous community in 
order to achieve the extraordinary cognitive accomplishment of becoming an independent 
practical reasoner. MacIntyre provides me, in this thesis, with an account of the relationship 
between flourishing and the virtues of acknowledged dependence. And I turn to this issue now. 
 
ARISTOTELEAN VIRTUES AND THE VIRTUES OF ACKNOWLEDGED 
DEPENDENCE 
To thrive within a community, we need to develop certain virtues. Aristotelian virtues are some 
of the needed virtues, but there are others. There are the virtues of acknowledged dependence 
that MacIntyre describes. Let us start with Aristotle, however. 
The reasoning which fully justifies practical judgement and action, 
on Aristotle’s account (N.E. 1144a 31-34) refers us in the end to 
what is the first premise for all claims of sound practical reasoning, 
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a premise of the form ‘Since the good and the best is such and 
such….’ But of course in order to reason soundly about what is 
best to do here and now, those who have relevant virtues, and 
above all the virtue of prudent judgment, rarely need and may even 
be unable to make explicit the chain of justificatory reasoning that 
their immediate practical reasoning presupposes, while those who 
lack the virtues will be incapable of sound practical reasoning. (p. 
106-107). 
 In any thesis MacIntyre puts forward which includes Aristotle at a fundamental level, 
there must be at least some type of further or partial agreement of exactly what, if any, ends 
might be achieved. Especially if one considers whether those ends, if reasoned properly, could 
turn out to also be a means. There is a reason why this process matters to us. It is because it is 
central to our decision-making process for questions like a) Why does this matter at all?  b) What 
is the next right thing for me to do in this circumstance? c) What is best for us to do as a social 
community of people? 
 MacIntyre claims on page 107-108: 
Practical reasoning is by its nature, on the generally Aristotelian 
view that I have been taking, reasoning together with others, 
generally within some determinate set of social relationships. 
Those relationships are initially formed and then developed as the 
relationships through which each of us first achieves and is then 
supported in the status of an independent practical reasoner. They 
are generally and characteristically first of all relationships of the 
family and household, then of schools and apprenticeships, and 
then of the range of practices in which adults of that particular 
society and culture engage. The making and sustaining of those 
relationships is inseparable from the development of those 
dispositions and activities through which each is directed towards 
becoming an independent practical reasoner. So the good of each 
cannot be pursued without also pursuing the good of all those who 
45 
 
participate in those relationships. For we cannot have a practically 
adequate understanding of our own good, of our own flourishing, 
apart from and independently of the flourishing of that whole set of 
social relationships in which we have found our place.  
 At some point in one’s life, one must reach the conclusion that many people along the 
way have contributed to any success one might be enjoying in one’s life. Certainly, there must be 
some element of spiritual development as well as gratitude for the many seasons of one’s life as 
well as blessings. MacIntyre makes it clear throughout his book that there are many people near 
to us who are suffering, but yet perhaps grateful to be alive. One is reminded that the virtue of 
kindness takes very little to extend to anyone. If a person gets cross with a neighbour, instead of 
using the club of anger, direct emotion to the question: how may I be helpful to this person. 
Remember the examples of Martin Luther King Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi, who both changed an 
embattled world. The world in many ways is much the same after their time; however, it is much 
better for having their examples in it. Another such example might be Nelson Mandela. In order 
to become an independent practical reasoner, one must live in a community in which others, 
principally one’s parents, but not only one’s parents, and not only when one is a child, have been 
willing to give one their time and effort unconditionally. Ghandi , Luther King Jr. and Mandela 
give us political examples of this, but there must be people throughout a community who manage 
to give to others selflessly, just as they did, but on a more intimate scale. Just in the way these 
three leaders gave unconditionally to their causes so must one give in the same way to others, 
one’s family, community, organizations, in order to become an effective independent practical 
reasoner. One must be prepared to do this even if one never receives anything in return. In this 
formula, it is all about the kind of giving that makes the chain work. Putting the virtues into 
action can only produce positive results. MacIntyre refers to the vital link Aristotle provides not 
only to the virtues, but also to what Aristotle refers to as the best life.  
 What is Aristotle’s version of the best life? Aristotle included the virtues high on his list, 
as part of living the good life. However, there was more. It was this entire canon of virtues that 
made a person a very admirable member of society. In fact Aristotle’s whole argument seems to 
be that life is an activity we get to engage in. If we live it according to the virtues, then the best 
life, or Eudaimonia as Aristotle called it, is the product.  
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 Some people just want to get through life. Others, perhaps at some point, want to find an 
understanding of human excellence. As humans learn the virtues they can begin at a really basic 
level. For example, most people know basic right from wrong. By simply practicing doing the 
next right thing in one’s life, one can really begin at any starting point. Let’s take an example in 
human relations which we all have to deal with. Perhaps someone does something one absolutely 
doesn’t agree with. Should one just dive in head first and tell them they are wrong? Maybe not. 
After all, is it wise to act as judge, jury and executioner of others? If everyone went around 
intervening judgmentally in everyone else’s life, we would just have much more of what we see 
on the fringes of our world: people breaking up into warring factions. Usually if we adopt a non-
judgmental attitude to others, but live as a demonstration of what we think is the best life, we 
have the best chance of effecting change. By contrast, judgmental intervention breeds 
resentment.  
 Now might be a good time to mention of the overall thesis statement of this work. 
Integrity and selflessness are the keys to what one may call the best life. What is the best life? It 
is a life way beyond what one ever could have imagined. Through the practice of principles, 
starting with the cornerstone of honesty, one finds an entire world of the virtues opening up, the 
same ones Aristotle, MacIntyre and Thomas Aquinas have spoken of. This is important because 
the practice of these virtues as a way of life will bring about the much desired personality 
change. This change is nothing short of a transformation much needed to remove the self-
centeredness that plagues humanity.  
Self-centeredness is a scourge and consumes humans, and through it comes all forms of 
narcissistic delusions and self-seeking. If there is to be any moral progress, self-centeredness 
must be removed without regret. Once this is removed from the person and replaced with 
selflessness, it is possible to fuse integrity and selflessness. Then and only then does one have the 
perfect combination for living the best life and for living within a flourishing and successful 
community. 
 MacIntyre develops this thought in terms of the norms required to sustain productive 
relationships in a flourishing community. He examines Adam Smith’s famous claim about the 
economic motives of people working together. (1999, p. 116, 117) 
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It is then only in the context of and by reference to norms of giving 
and receiving that we can spell out what is involved in different 
types of affective relationships. It is the acknowledgement of those 
norms that give us grounds for our expectations of others and for 
their expectations of us. Affective and sympathetic ties are always 
more than a matter of affection and sympathy. And in a similar 
way relationships of rational exchange, governed by norms to 
which it is to the advantage of each participant to adhere, are also 
embedded in and sustained by relationships governed by norms of 
uncalculated and unpredicted giving and receiving. So it is with 
those institutionalized relationships that make possible the 
exchange of markets. 
It is indeed true that “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their 
regard to their own interest” (Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations 1, 
ii). And just as butcher, brewer and baker generally act with regard 
to their own interest, so too do their customer. But if on entering 
the butcher’s shop as a habitual customer, I find him collapsing 
from a heart attack, and I merely remark ‘Ah! Not in a position to 
sell me my meat to-day, I see,’ and proceed immediately to his 
competitor’s store to complete my purchase, I will have obviously 
and grossly damaged my whole relationship to him, including my 
economic relationship, although I will have done nothing contrary 
to the norms of the market. Less obviously and less grossly, even if 
I respond to his condition only by satisfying those minimum 
requirements that will enable me to rebut quasilegal accusations of 
irresponsibility – I call an ambulance and the moment the medical 
technicians arrive I leave – I will still have undermined my 
relationship to him and his, by my avoidance of my larger 
responsibility. Market relationships can only be sustained by being 
embedded in certain types of local nonmarket relationships, 
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relationships of uncalculated giving and receiving, if they are to 
contribute to overall flourishing, rather than, as they so often do, 
undermine and corrupt communal ties. 
 What is the role of the individual in the construction and maintenance of a moral 
community? Benevolence in and among one’s community of peers is absolutely essential, not 
only for one’s growth as human beings, but also for every aspect of life. A good person may be 
the only example of goodwill towards others, the virtues in practice, and good character that 
another person ever sees. Adam Smith’s example, cited by MacIntyre, where goods are 
exchanged in a market, presupposes a community of a shared network of both the giver and the 
receiver. And yet lots of people will remain selfish and inward looking. They will continue to ask 
what’s in it for me. It may be only through a major life defeat that the development of an open 
mind occurs. If an example of virtue is presented to them at the right time, it just might make the 
difference.  
 What is the relationship between benevolence – the constant exercise of goodwill, the 
sharing of goods – and selflessness? MacIntyre describes a relationship to others in which the 
virtues of acknowledged dependence predominate. But what exactly are these virtues? 
Benevolence is the virtue of goodwill towards others. Selflessness is the virtue of eliminating 
self-centeredness. Integrity is the virtue of standing up for one’s deepest and most well-founded 
principles. All of these are necessary elements of a happy, well-rounded life. I think that these 
virtues constitute the virtues of acknowledged dependence. The reason we must eliminate self-
centeredness and selfishness is that we live as creatures in a community in which we are at 
various points in our lives wholly dependent on others. Recall, that I defined selflessness in 
chapter 2 as putting others in one’s life ahead of oneself. It is not a pure form of benevolence, in 
which the needs of others is all that determines one’s actions and our relation to others does not 
enter the picture. It is a matter of getting outside of self-centered, self-concerned thinking. It is 
way of relating to others which puts our relation to them on a higher plane. The value of 
MacIntyre’s account of our status as dependent rational animals is that it demonstrates the need 
to expand our understanding of the virtues to include the virtues of selflessness and integrity.  
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Chapter 4: ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters of this thesis I described the relationship between the concepts of integrity, 
selflessness and the virtues, in particular the virtues of acknowledged dependence. I have 
claimed that these three things are essential components of the good life and human happiness. 
To support this claim I now examine the nature of happiness and the good life through a 
discussion of Aristotle’s views and the views of St Thomas Aquinas. The key concern here is the 
relationship between virtue and happiness. MacIntyre’s idea that virtues of acknowledged 
dependence are reflective of our status as dependent rational animals does not yet establish a 
clear link between personal virtue and personal happiness. It provides a link between community 
flourishing and personal virtue, but another link is needed. To explore the possibility of a further 
link between personal happiness and personal virtue, I turn to the philosophy of Aristotle and 
Aquinas. 
What is happiness? According to Aristotle, it the highest good. So why do so many 
humans have so much trouble with something seemingly so valuable? How can it be so elusive 
to us if it truly is the highest good? Perhaps people go about looking for happiness in the wrong 
manner, or may not really recognize it when they see it. Then again, people may look for 
happiness in false things: things that are not lasting, like money, possessions, property and the 
like. These are fleeting and soon lost. A key claim in my thesis is that happiness is an inside job. 
What this means is that gratitude, integrity, practice and belief in the virtues creates a new and 
vital happiness. The results that are felt at once are not only surprising but also extremely 
concrete and beneficial for one’s life. The formula resembles Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia 
in the Nicomachean Ethics (1097b).  
Now happiness more than anything else, seems unconditionally 
complete, since we always choose it because of itself, never 
because of something else. Honor, pleasure, understanding and 
every virtue we certainly choose because of themselves, since we 
could choose each of them even if it had no further result, but we 
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also choose them for the sake of happiness, supposing that through 
them we shall be happy. Happiness, by contrast, no one ever 
chooses for their sake, or for the sake of anything else at all. 
 
At this point, I would like to signal what I take to be a limitation on Aristotle’s 
perspective here. Aristotle claims that happiness is an end in itself. But does this 
idea travel through the ages to our own time? Can we afford to think of happiness 
as an end in itself? What is the value of my own happiness if it does not 
contribute to the happiness of others? According to my theory of the happiness 
bank, which I develop in the next chapter, happiness is a shared investment, one 
that pays dividends throughout a community. It is not a merely personal goal, it is 
a public goal. Aristotle involves the good of others in his own conception of 
happiness in a distinctive way. He writes (1097b): 
   
The same conclusion (that happiness is complete) also appears to 
follow from self-sufficiency, since the complete good seems to be 
self-sufficient. Now what we count as self-sufficient is not what 
suffices for a solitary person by himself, living an isolated life, but 
what suffices also for parents, children, wife and in general for 
friends, and fellow-citizens, since a human being is a naturally 
political (animal). Here, however, we must impose some limit; for 
if we extend the good to parents’ parents and children’s children 
and to friends of friends, we shall go on without limit; but we must 
examine this another time. Anyhow, we regard something as self-
sufficient when all by itself it makes a life choice worthy and 
lacking nothing; and that is what we think happiness does 
(N.E.1097b).      
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When it comes to Aristotle, happiness has little to do with how we feel and how well we are 
doing by ourselves, and a whole lot more to do with who we are in society. In Aristotle’s society, 
Classical Greece, status was the fundamental mark of a successful life. For Aristotle, it may have 
been the elite of society but they were not measured by their money alone; for example one 
might be quite wealthy indeed, but without friendship one could not be happy. The perfect 
happiness or ‘Eudamonia’ translates as a type of objective well-being and success and this 
success must happen in the context of a flourishing community of friends and fellow citizens. 
The contrast between Aristotle’s view and my view is that Aristotle sees happiness as a kind of 
personal flourishing within a flourishing community and I see it as a kind of personal 
achievement,  a deep and abiding enjoyment of life that is meaningless without its being directed 
outward at the happiness of others. 
  Much of this personal achievement has to do with how one achieves happiness in the first 
place. When people choose virtuous actions for their own sake they are choosing the highest 
form of living. By a simple act of doing the right thing and continuous action in this direction, 
good moral character is established. After a time, people begin to take these actions for their own 
sake. They become self-evidently choice-worthy to all who understand them. The results 
eventually bring about an inner peace, an inner happiness, and serenity that no person or thing in 
this world can take away from us. When people choose virtuous actions for their own sake they 
are choosing the highest form of living. 
 We cannot afford to live an isolated life. This will not promote happiness nor is it self-
sufficient. Even nuns live in a nunnery and never, or rarely, alone. The isolation chamber does 
not even help prisoners in prison, it usually has the opposite effect. (See Lisa Guenther 2014.) 
Humans are social animals; I believe there is no other avenue to happiness. 
 We know that for Aristotle the highest good is happiness. So then, it would follow that a 
person with perfect happiness lacks for nothing. This could mean perhaps that, no matter what 
they have or don’t have, they would still be able to maintain their happiness. So for a person who 
practices the virtues in life we might say that are working on or building on what I would call a 
happiness bank.  
At this point in my discussion, I would like to introduce my of a happiness bank and 
contrast it with Aristotle’s concept of Eudaimonia. I will return to a discussion of the happiness 
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in Chapter 5. My concept of the happiness bank is repository of positive feeling towards others 
and generous and virtuous actions towards others that is both a personal state and a shared 
community condition. When we act well towards others we add to a community of virtue. We 
make available to others the idea of a life that is directed virtuous feeling and action towards 
others. It becomes a shared fact of the community’s moral condition. It is a real thing, not a mere 
perception of a thing. It alters one’s community. And it alters individuals themselves. So the 
happiness bank has two aspects. As one makes deposits into the happiness bank one both 
improves the morality of one’s community and oneself. And the more deposits, the more 
substantial the bank becomes and the greater the community’s stock of moral goodness. The 
community becomes a better place and a happier one. The person, the depositor, becomes a 
better and a happier member of the community. 
The more deposits of good deeds towards others – things that are pointed towards our 
shared, larger good – the better. This happiness bank is important because it can never become 
full enough with the virtues one performs; it should become a lifetime practice. The reason is 
twofold. One is that happiness is a byproduct of living the right kind of life and one would desire 
this. However, the second and most important reason is that we may one day need this happiness 
bank and call upon it and draw out from it at a crucial moment to help the ill, the disabled, the 
abandoned, and the down trodden. And we may need it for ourselves.  
 If the deposits we make in the happiness bank are meaningful, right actions, they will 
automatically make us happy. This happiness is infectious. These right virtuous actions may now 
even become part of a community’s bank of happiness. In this way the deposits are doubled, and 
tripled and gain interest. I think that deposits into the happiness bank do not sit idle; they 
increase and communities become happier and more resilient. The growth of virtue in a 
community is like compound interest. And with it happiness within the community. 
 One point of difference between my concept of the happiness bank and an ordinary 
savings bank is that, in a savings bank, one maintains ownership of one’s deposits. They are 
shared together in order to grow wealth, but one may always withdraw what one owns. In a 
happiness bank, by contrast, the moral wealth, happiness and resilience of a community are 
distributed to others on the basis of need and membership. In this sense, a happiness bank 
operates more like a cooperative venture than a traditional bank. 
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 Let us look at the differences between the Aristotelian way of life, two and a half 
thousand years ago, and then the benefit of the happiness bank in the twenty-first century. 
Firstly, Aristotle was interested in the good and noble citizen. He took deep pleasure in all 
success, which is the opposite of humility. He approved of living well and doing beautiful things. 
He also valued successful relations; but, with whom? Perhaps only relations with the well 
thought of, highly educated, upper class of society were valuable to him. In reality, Aristotle’s 
philosophy overall was not bankable. There were no real deposits going into any happiness bank, 
no capital, in terms of investment, that could ever be drawn out at a later time. The reason is the 
Greek subjects were not treated as equals in Classical Greek society. I would argue, if we look 
through the concept of the happiness bank, Aristotle’s lack of humility would not allow his 
fellow Greek subjects such terms of investiture. The philosophy of humility as it applies to life 
for us is a strength, not a weakness, which I would argue is the opposite of Aristotle’s view and a 
key to the happiness bank.  
Now let us look at some of the other things we might find in the happiness bank itself. To 
list just a few, there is cheerfulness, laughter, positivity and resilience. When we have these 
things, we are unlikely to sink back into self-pity. We will find pleasure in small things in life. 
We become forward looking. We possess a sense of self-esteem to show to others. And of 
course, we have a sense of subjective well-being, or happiness. That is, we have a deep and 
abiding experience of enjoyment of life and a sense that it is good. 
 A moral community should be based on teaching children that instant gratification is self-
defeating and does nothing for communities. Let us take an example:  
John gets into his car driving on a suspended license but never goes to court to clear up the 
ticket. He must go to his job to keep a roof over his head and food on the table. Everything goes 
well for a time, then one day he is pulled over for a broken taillight. Another bad result for John: 
a trip to the watch house, and then a session before a judge, all because he failed to answer the 
earlier charge. A result of pure negligence or belligerence, it adds to John’s well of resentment 
and unhappiness. Given enough of these types of episodes and resentments, John may become an 
unhappy outlaw of society. 
 We would somehow want John to make contributions of his own to a happiness bank. 
But how can this be accomplished considering the path he has set himself on? Perhaps through a 
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court appointed mentor, John could see a new example of what happiness is like. A vision for 
others is just like that: it shows them, through an example of many years of happiness, just what 
may be achieved. This is not a perfect science. However, years of freedom from the emotions of 
self-pity and self-centeredness, with only the wish to make large interest bearing deposits in a 
happiness bank to be shared with all, is the answer the virtues point us towards.  
 Happiness is a better way to act and react to life. Life seems to take on a new found 
freedom and inner peace when viewed in this light. This same light of happiness, which allows 
us to make our deposits each day, can readily be seen by others. Unlike worldly goods, the 
bankable existence we live in is one in which we constantly must think of others and their needs. 
If newcomers exposed to the happiness bank could see no overall purpose or benefit or 
especially happiness, they would not want it for themselves. A mentor or exemplar may be the 
only example of a truly bankable way of life they will ever see. The true question about this way 
of life when looking at all the other alternatives in the world, is how fleeting the others are on the 
scale of happiness. Things measured in pure monetary terms such as possessions, houses, yachts 
are only temporal and are soon lost. 
 Aristotle remarks in the N.E. 1097b: 
… we think happiness is most choice worthy of all goods, since it 
is not counted as one good among many. If it were counted as one 
among many, then, clearly, we think that the addition of the 
smallest of goods would make it more choice worthy; for (the 
smallest good) that is added becomes an extra quantity of goods 
(so creating a good larger than the original good), and the larger of 
the two goods is always more choice worthy. (But we do not think 
any addition can make happiness more choice worthy; hence it is 
most choice worthy). 
 Happiness, then, is something complete and self-sufficient, and does not compete with 
other goods and is not improved by adding anything else.   
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AQUINAS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS 
In his book ‘Dependent Rational Animals’ (1999), which I discussed in chapter 3, Alasdair 
MacIntyre makes it absolutely clear that in order to get, keep and maintain the virtues, which 
promote happiness in us and others, what one gives away to others may be disproportionate to 
anything one may receive. The willingness to think of others needs first must be unconditional. 
 MacIntyre claims: (1999, p. 111) 
Without such virtues and the rule-following integral to their 
exercise, we will not only be deficient in discharging our 
responsibilities, but we will also be unable to deliberate adequately 
with others about the allocation of responsibilities. And, since such 
deliberation is necessary for achieving our common good, we will 
frustrate the achievement of that common good. It was upon this 
aspect of these rules that Aquinas focused attention, when he 
characterized them as included among the precepts of the natural 
law. On Aquinas’s account, for a precept to be a law of any kind, it 
must be a precept of reason (Summa Theologiae 90, 1) directed to 
a common good (90, 2) and promulgated to a community by 
someone with the requisite authority (90, 3, 4). The precepts of the 
natural law are those precepts promulgated by God through reason 
without conformity to which human beings cannot achieve their 
common good. 
 
Aquinas supplements Aristotle’s account of the relationship between virtue and happiness with 
an account of the common good and preconditions for our achieving the common good. Aquinas 
holds that these preconditions involve a willingness to follow the virtuous direction of a person 
in authority. Aquinas grounds the virtues in natural law, which in turn reflects God’s will and 
providential concern for the world.  
 In my opinion, moral authority really only exists as moral exemplars. For instance, John, 
in the example above, will not find virtue and happiness by merely following the edicts of a 
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judge, but must be inspired by a mentor to invest in a community’s happiness bank. His way into 
a life of virtue is through the example of others who are both happy and good. Once he follows 
the example, he will discover that there is no way back to his former life. The recognition of 
moral authority comes after this achievement, not before it. He may come to know and love that 
moral authority. It may also be that the source of this authority comes to him in an act of grace. 
But the important point for me in this discussion is to contrast Aquinas’ appeal to authority as a 
precondition of virtue with my own view of the role of moral exemplars as a precondition of 
becoming virtuous. 
 Aquinas lists the cardinal virtues as temperance, prudence (i.e. practical wisdom), justice 
and courage. To these he adds three theological virtues: faith, hope and charity. The cardinal 
virtues would be recognized by anyone in Classical Greece, but the theological virtues are new. 
These cardinal and theological virtues are a path to integrity, love of this world, one’s fellow 
man, selflessness. The role of faith as a virtue is controversial, as is hope. For me, the key virtue 
in addition to the cardinal virtues is charity, which comes closest to my conception of 
selflessness. 
 This is not to say that a person’s concern for their own happiness undermines this charity 
or selflessness. As MacIntyre puts it: 
‘Hence it may seem that a radical justification for my action will 
always be of the form: Because to act will contribute to my 
achievement of my good, qua human being. It follows that if, in 
the type of example that I have outlined, I do what the virtue of 
just generosity requires and act so as to aid the stranger in need, 
my reason for action, if it is a good reason, will never be simply 
that the stranger was in urgent need, but must also be that by acting 
so as to meet that need I contributed to the achievement of my own 
good. There is then after all a further justification for aiding the 
stranger (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 159). 
MacIntyre is saying that when I act virtuously I am contributing to my own good as well as the 
good of others. Ideals of virtue and personal happiness combine to give me reasons to act. They 
cannot be properly separated from each other. In helping another person, I am at the same time 
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helping myself and there is no good reason for me to deny this when I reflect upon my actions 
and their motivations. 
 Aquinas says that all humans wish for ultimate fulfillment. This fulfillment is that 
humans desire their perfection, whether they know it or not. This, he adds, is the same fulfillment 
in which human beings’ final end consists (ST 1a11 ae1.7). Although there is much disagreement 
about what a final end consists of, Aquinas, like Aristotle, believes that end is happiness, and is a 
perfect good. 
So here we see where Aquinas divides the human being into two parts. Somehow he 
makes the concrete decision to go even farther than Aristotle when it comes to the virtues. He 
tries to complete the entire list for man to try to follow. By practicing these virtues in our lives 
with integrity and selflessness towards all other humans, one begins to get the picture that not 
owning one’s life is the best life possible.  
Aquinas adds a concept of natural law to Aristotle’s concept of a virtuous person and a 
good life. The natural law is a set of rules for conduct that reflect both human nature and God’s 
intentions for us. What is the relationship between the precepts of natural law and the virtues? 
According to MacIntyre 
The precepts of Natural Law however include much more than 
rules. For among the precepts of the natural law are precepts which 
enjoin us to do whatever the virtues require of us (94, 3). We are 
enjoined to do whatever it is that courage or justice or 
temperateness demand on this or that occasion and always, in so 
acting, to act prudently. Notice that at the level of practice we need 
no reason for some particular action over and above that it is in this 
situation what one or more of the virtues require. The acts required 
by the virtues are each of them worth performing for their own 
sake. They are indeed always also a means to something further, 
just because they are constitutive parts of human flourishing. But it 
is precisely as acts worth performing for their own sake that they 
are such parts. 
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So if one lives a life of compassion, generosity and justice, all for the sake of other 
humans, surely one is living as natural law dictates. Practicing these many virtues is one’s just 
reply to the question of life, and a sufficient idea of what is a good and meaningful life. By a 
constant searching of oneself, one may find that selflessness and integrity that helps one to 
realize that one cannot own one’s own life. All we have to do to test this theory is to think of any 
or all of the people we have known in our own lives. They meticulously plan out their lives in 
this way or that and when it does not go their way they get extremely upset. Such people treat 
their own lives as if it were a possession. It is as if their life is like a car, and they get upset when 
it breaks down. 
Is it possible that one really has to have the understanding of the metaphysical basis of 
this answer? One could speculate about a power greater than oneself or not, but humans have 
argued over the question for many centuries. We could also consider ourselves to be the most 
intelligent agents in this universe, the beginning and the end of all life forms. But are we really 
the beginning and the end of all life forms or just one of many? Most of us humans, when we are 
truly honest with ourselves, realize we have very little power over anything whether it be our day 
to day existence or even the longer term. So the answer would seem to be that one is powerless 
over the entire outcome of one’s life. The only thing one has any control over is the attitude and 
actions that one takes in each day. And this is important because if these virtuous un-self-
centered actions are directed towards humanity, one would make the world a better, just place to 
live. Obviously happiness would follow because serving humanity is a human’s highest purpose. 
There is no other. Thus, the result could be that a new power for living a life of integrity and 
selflessness will flow into one’s life. 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Aquinas set out to develop the list of virtues he found 
in Aristotle. He describes what he called the cardinal virtues and then the sub virtues. The four 
cardinal virtues are prudence, justice, temperance and courage (ST I-II, 61.2). We shall get into 
all of these in due course, however, let us in the first place, set out some of the ways that Aquinas 
defines just what a virtue is. He makes mention that all of the virtues make a contribution to our 
rational perfection and that all acts of virtue are prescribed by natural law. (ST I-II, 94.4) 
Aquinas thinks that human happiness is directly related to a relationship with God. And 
that relationship makes our lives as close to perfect as it is possible for us to be here on Earth. It 
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is when we perform the virtues in relation to God, that we receive this happiness in return. He 
says that human beings “attain their last end by knowing and loving God” (ST I-II, 2.8). 
The cardinal virtues aim at helping us to act. Prudence helps us decide on a plan, courage 
helps us to see our plans through to the end. Temperance stops us from overstepping the line and 
hurting others out of weakness and selfish desire. It also gives us a sense of humility; without 
self-control we cannot play our assigned part in the world. Justice helps us to remember that we 
are not the only people on the planet and that other people need to be considered and have 
claims.  
For Aquinas, one can never achieve complete or total happiness in life here on Earth. He 
believed that a union with God is the only thing that makes this possible. For our purpose here, 
as mentioned earlier, we need not debate whether Aquinas was right or wrong about this. What 
one will hold to is what is right, and in however or whatever world Saint Thomas may have 
existed, he helped to, no doubt, transform our understanding of human nature for the better. And 
anything that transforms a human being’s attitude for the better will enliven their spirit. A 
person’s spirit is their overall attitude to life: the compass through which they live. 
Another way to think of whether or not one’s action is good or bad, might be through the 
ability of human reason; because this is the measuring stick of just how we evaluate our own and 
other human acts. However, Aquinas once again presses the issue, and so he does with natural 
law. He makes the claim that every law comes from eternal law, which is grounded in God. 
Aquinas uses a lot of different terminology all to explain what he claims natural law is. It is an 
extension of the eternal law. Then just for good measure, he says that God is the one who ordains 
all of this, including final happiness, because that same God gives us a knowledge of what is 
good. Saint Thomas says these things are just weaved into the very fabric of our nature. And 
because of this the natural desires we have help us to continue the kind of flourishing that is good 
and proper for the human race. He also thinks humans have the unique ability to reason along the 
lines of what he terms ‘first principle’ which is fundamental to one’s life. These natural laws and 
principles bring out practical reasoning in humans in such a way that evil may be avoided and 
good done. Aquinas would go on to indicate that as people on Earth our thoughts about just what 
part we should play or how we should act, if we do so by virtue – by our natural self-
determination to decide for or against evil or goodness in this world – are the things that can 
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propel us towards perfection as humans (ST I-II, 94.2 – 94.3). One needs to ask the question, just 
which way is my rational self, better off? Perhaps, it is just trying to do better and striving for 
some of the things Aquinas speaks of. 
One purpose of this thesis is to point out that Saint Thomas Aquinas’ moral philosophy 
was mostly in agreement with Aristotle; especially when it comes to the term of Eudaimonia or 
happiness. He also agrees that working the virtues is absolutely necessary to achieve absolute 
and total happiness. However, there are a few differences between the two philosophers, mainly, 
in Saint Thomas’s case, it comes from what he refers to as a relationship with God, or beatitude. 
He claims that we cannot achieve final happiness on our own. This may be somewhat shocking 
or even disliked by many when first encountered, but Aquinas says this beatitude, this 
relationship, may only be accomplished by being virtuous. He then indicates how humanity is 
drawn forward to supernatural happiness, given the full grace of God. 
Aquinas lists the theological virtues that help to bring about this happiness; the ones 
listed by Saint Paul in the Corinthians: faith, hope, charity, or what can be thought of as love. 
Aquinas claims that loving one’s neighbor may be as close to God as one will ever get here on 
Earth. He goes further by stating if a person says he loves his God but does not love his 
neighbor, he is conflicted. He must love both.  
This virtue of charity Aquinas speaks of should be just as relevant today as in his time. 
After all, it contributes to one’s happiness, for we know it is a virtue and it contributes to 
humankind. Charity, because of its reciprocal nature of giving to and receiving, if Aquinas is 
right, is a type of supernatural wisdom and intuitively beneficial process.  
 
CARDINAL VIRTUES AND THEIR SUB-VIRTUES 
I will return the discussion now to cardinal virtues and their characteristics. Just as temperance is 
a cardinal virtue, so is prudence in the same category. Some sub-virtues of these are chastity, 
sobriety, and abstinence, which basically stand for a victory over one’s appetite of sex, victory 
over one’s appetite for drink, and doing without pleasures. Surprisingly enough though, Aquinas 
also argues for the fact that humility is also a part of temperance (ST ll-ll 161.4). The problem is 
that humility is something one may not achieve fully. One can only try to aim for a sense of the 
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tempering of one’s instincts to the best of one’s ability. One will never achieve perfection. 
Humility is just about trying to do the best one may be, and to restrain temptations to think too 
well of oneself. Moderation is the key in all things whether for a factory worker, airline pilot, or 
philosopher. As humans we need to avoid extremes that can lead us to misery and selfishness. 
What are these extremes? Number one is the delusion that being self-centered in any or grasping 
all things for oneself is a winning strategy in life.  
 What is the relationship between humility and self-abnegation?  In order to live a more 
useful and flourishing life one ought to include humility as a guide to one’s aspirations.  As we 
reflect upon, our motives, our actions, and our intentions, we should ask the following question..  
Are we once again trying to be like the lead actor (page 30), arranging everything to suite our 
own self-centred ideas about how the play should be run?  Then, on the other hand, we could be 
like the golf caddie (page,27) just satisfied to play our part in the big picture of life and the golf 
course.  If one can answer yes, to the second question one manifests the virtue of humility. 
Going back to Aquinas’s list of virtues, he includes meekness, clemency and studiousness 
as a part of the virtue of temperance (ST ll-ll 161.4). These may help to restrain bottled up anger 
and especially resentment in people. When people desire to get even, this can be especially 
dangerous because this rage can and does turn inward like battery acid and eats its own 
container. With the virtue of courage, humans can get a sense of nobility and endurance, and 
stand tough in some pretty dangerous circumstances. Even when life and limb are in danger or 
are threatened, people will stand steadfast because they possess courage, and they have seen its 
works performed for them (ST ll-ll 123.6). Self-confidence will come with a person who comes 
through life’s events with courage. Where does this courage come from? Perhaps one has the 
ability to see a purpose for one’s life’s work that is far greater than one’s own life (ST ll-ll 
128.1).  
Theological virtues, in particular hope, also play a role in human flourishing. For one 
who has lived in hope for many decades, it allows one to try to think of others first and to live 
with both selflessness and integrity. Hope is an attitude towards the future. It is a starting point; it 
allows one to be honest with oneself and to see a positive future for oneself. Patience and 
perseverance are needed each day as well. 
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From the precepts of natural law, it should be fairly simple to make pertinent life 
decisions on what one ought to do in any particular circumstance, and confusion can easily be 
avoided. This is simply the virtue of Prudence. According to Aquinas, prudence is a matter of 
thinking that enables us as human beings to think all of our actions, as well as reactions to life, 
through to the end result. Once again, Aquinas cautions us not to take any actions that interrupt 
good choices for our happiness. As humans progress we must always seek counsel, look to 
proper judgement and use prudence (ST ll-ll 47.8). 
 There are several other sub-virtues joined to this cardinal virtue called Prudence, as Saint 
Thomas sees it. They are things such as caution, memory, circumspection, intelligence, foresight, 
docility, reason and shrewdness. Without any or all of these, one might make mental mistakes 
that could prevent one from living a happy virtuous life (ST ll-ll 49.1-8).  
 So perhaps by good judgement, a measure of restraint modeled by one’s own philosophy, 
one could continue through these virtues to point towards the overall philosophy of Integrity and 
Selflessness.  
 One of the ways that Aquinas tries to demonstrate the goodness of humanity is his 
argument that all simple acts are for the sake of a single end. He says that this is the same for all 
people. So what is that end? As for Aristotle, that end is happiness. As humans, we will want to 
aim at the best we can do towards happiness here on earth knowing one will never completely 
reach it. Still we strive onward. Aquinas never really defines for anyone what this happiness may 
consist in. However, he makes it abundantly clear all humans seek some sort of fulfilment as we 
trudge our roads of human desire. 
Peter Kreeft notes in the Summa of the Summa that “when Saint Thomas says that 
happiness, unlike wealth, is good when possessed, not spread, he does not mean that our 
happiness is not in fact increased when we make others happy, but that the essential meaning of 
‘happiness’ is the satisfaction of an individual’s desires. These may and should include the desire 
to make others happy too (Kreeft, 1990, p. 361 (28)). I would go further than Aquinas in this. I 
think that the desire to make others happy is the most important of our desires and the key to 
one’s own happiness, in particular because it takes one out of self-centredness. 
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 “For man to serve things of any sort, according to Saint Thomas is to reverse the order of 
reality” (Kreeft 1990, p.362 (30)). Kreeft continues by observing that “St Thomas here assumes 
that man is an end, not a means. Yet he is not the final end. In Article 7, “On the contrary”, he 
says that man is to be loved not for his own sake (as final end) but for God’s sake. God is to be 
adored, man loved, and things used.” (Kreeft 1990, p. 362 (30)). This religious vision of what it 
is that makes human beings worth loving is not something I propose in this thesis. In the concept 
the happiness bank and how it works, discussed in the next chapter, Aquinas’ religious 
assumption is not needed. This is not to rule out Aquinas’ account, but I wish to remain neutral 
about it. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS 
To sum up Aquinas’s view of happiness and how it differs from Aristotle’s, I note that Aquinas 
distinguishes between perfect happiness and imperfect happiness.  He writes: “…man’s 
happiness is two-fold, one perfect, and the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are to 
understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness, and by imperfect happiness that 
which does not attain thereto, but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness” (ST I-II, 
3.6). Perfect happiness is dependent upon our relation to God. He writes “Final and perfect 
happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence” (ST 1-11, 3.8). 
Aquinas thinks that imperfect happiness is a partial vision of what complete happiness is like. It 
is a vision of beautific happiness that we cannot achieve here on Earth. Imperfect happiness 
comes from virtuous activity, but requires other things as well. Aquinas says “…Rectitude of the 
will is necessary for happiness both antecedently and concomitantly…. Concomitantly, because 
as stated above … final happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very 
essence of goodness. So that the will of him who sees the essence of God, of necessity, loves, 
whatever he loves, in subordination to God, just as the will of him who sees not God’s Essence, 
of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And 
this is precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is evident that happiness cannot be 
without a right will. (ST I-II 4.4). So, for Aquinas, living virtuously is necessary for happiness. 
Aquinas also thinks, like Aristotle, that external goods (such as health and friends) are necessary 
for happiness on Earth. But perfect happiness does not require them. “For imperfect happiness, 
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such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of 
happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of 
virtue…” (ST I-II 4.7). And he says, “On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise 
necessary for perfect happiness, which consists in seeing God.” (ST I-II 4.7). Aquinas has a 
religious idea of perfect happiness, but an idea of imperfect happiness closely related to 
Aristotle’s idea of Eudaimonia. Aquinas gets his notion of perfect happiness (Contemplation of 
God) from Aristotle. It comes from Aristotle’s discussion of contemplation in book 10 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. However, Aristotle asserts that a morally good life, by itself, results in a 
kind of secondary, somewhat incomplete, happiness and it is this that I am concerned with in this 
thesis. 
  In my view neither Aristotle nor Aquinas fully explains the relationship between 
personal virtue and personal happiness. Aristotle does not appreciate the way individual 
happiness requires humility. And he does not appreciate the reciprocal nature of how humility 
and happiness work hand in hand. My happiness is directly proportional to what I give to others. 
Aristotle thinks that happiness is achieving noble things, but the important thing for a person’s 
happiness is that they are making others happy too.  
 Aquinas, by contrast, thinks that perfect happiness is supernatural happiness and exists 
through one’s relationship to God. Although I do not claim to refute him, I believe that human 
happiness can be gained by having a sense of humility and thinking of others first. This may be 
imperfect happiness or it might be perfect happiness. I don’t claim to know. But it is happiness 
nonetheless. What is required next is an account of the happiness bank and the relationship 
between virtue and happiness that can be found in it. This is the topic of Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE HAPPINESS BANK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
My concept of the happiness bank is a repository of positive feeling towards others and generous 
and virtuous actions towards others that is both a personal state and a shared community 
condition. When we practice the virtues with others in mind, the outcome is almost invariably 
good. When we take actions in this manner we make available the idea of a good life to others. 
We help others directly by acting virtuously, but we also point them towards integrity. We 
become an example of what is possible and in this way add to the community and help others 
indirectly. We give others a perception of benevolence that becomes available to them. This is 
what it means to make a deposit into the happiness bank. It has three aspects. First, one improves 
the community directly through action. Second, one improves the community through example. 
Third, one improves oneself by becoming happier and increasing one’s integrity. These three 
aspects feed off of each other and mutually enhance each other. This is why it makes sense to 
think of the happiness bank as a bank. Deposits grow; membership grows; benevolence grows; 
shared happiness grows.  
 The other aspect of a bank is that one may make withdrawals from it. When tragedy 
strikes a person, they should be able to rely on others to help and console them. The bank has 
many members who were once in this position who would welcome the opportunity to help and 
console others. The repository of good will and integrity which is the happiness bank is available 
to others in their time of need. The bank represents the moral resources of a community. Without 
a community that cares, there could be no bank. To withdraw resources from the bank is to 
appeal to the community to dispense benevolent actions, to care and to help. 
        
HOW DOES SELFLESSNESS RELATE TO THE HAPPINESS BANK? 
What is the way of unique happiness that is most beneficial to humans? Humans seem to benefit 
from reciprocal relationships with each other. This unique and beneficial happiness is not 
something one should keep to oneself like something found in a treasure chest. Just what exactly 
is this newfound higher plane of happiness and what is the relationship of selflessness to it? I 
have been trying to spell out the thought that integrity and selflessness are two sides of the same 
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coin. These two attributes of human life can help take people out of themselves and think less 
like self-centered egotistical humans at the center of the universe. In this way humility has a 
chance to do its work in human hearts. People begin to care more about others and their 
problems than anything that could possibly be going wrong in their own lives. They become 
more generous and benevolent towards others. They no longer look for any benefit in return. The 
positive realm of happiness in one’s life, and to let others begin to see the benefits of a virtuous 
and selfless investiture that will pay dividends for a lifetime, should not be missed. This is the 
way of happiness that is most beneficial to humans.  
 The whole concept of the happiness bank is really quite elementary at its core. Bentham 
and Mill introduced the idea of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of 
people. As utilitarians, they thought that it was always right to try to achieve this. Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s discussion of dependent rational animals showed me how benevolence and virtue is 
a key to human flourishing and happiness, giving our dependent and rational natures. Aristotle 
argued that happiness is the highest good, and Saint Thomas Aquinas argued that virtue 
promotes integrity and love of the world. The result is, with faith and God’s grace, supernatural 
happiness. In a secular mode, the result is human happiness. 
Let me introduce three examples of happiness and its absence. 
Example 1: Someone who is happy because they practice the virtues and feel good about 
themselves and they practice benevolence towards others in a selfless way. 
Example 2: Someone who is happy because they are successful. They have a successful career, a 
good reputation, a successful marriage, and material possessions. 
Example 3: Someone who is happy because they get what they most want and take pleasure from 
it, for example, someone who is a snow skier and who skis all over the world.  
Now consider example 3. To ski is what really makes this person the most happy of anything on 
earth. However, the snow skier only has a beautiful skiing life for himself. Imagine that one day 
he breaks a leg and collar bone in a skiing accident. He has nothing to fall back on. He is a 
member of no happiness bank. Therefore his beautiful life of skiing is suspended. 
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 The most important difference between the three examples is that the person in example 1 
is not invested in self and does not draw happiness from some contingent aspect of the self. By 
contrast, in example 3, the skier is happy before his accident in a sense, but this is a false 
happiness. It has no secure foundation. When things go wrong for him he has nothing to fall back 
on. The nature of his happiness is built on false pretenses. It is built on a lonely and isolated 
pleasure.  
 The second example is of happiness based on pride and self-esteem. Because she has got 
all these great things in her life, she has proved to the world, she thinks, what true happiness is. 
But it is false because it is also selfish and self-centered. Its foundation is not based on any type 
of true integrity. The minute the successful person’s success falls flat, they have no basis for 
happiness.  
 The first example is completely different. If you are selfless and practicing integrity, it 
doesn’t matter what you have or don’t have. Since you care about others more than you care 
about yourself, you will continue to practice the things that bring about happiness for others and 
consequently yourself. This is a mutually enhance each other. This is a kind of happiness that 
builds and grows on its own. It doesn’t require success or privilege or great possessions. The 
happiness bank is based on this kind of selfless happiness. The bank deposits grow because 
selfless happiness and personal happiness work together.  
It is the nature of finding this treasure of so much goodwill within oneself that one would 
want to give it away to others. Selflessness is to hold other human beings in higher regard than 
one holds oneself. Therefore, the paradoxical intent of the happiness bank is met when, by 
making regular interest bearing deposits into the bank, we show others the exact nature of the 
cause and effect of the bank. It is an effect that comes from the inside out.  
 What are some current examples of selflessness? Mother Theresa, Mahatma Gandhi, 
Nelson Mandela, Dr. Martin Luther King and even Abraham Lincoln are positive examples. 
They all saw a type of work for humanity that lay before them, that needed to be done; selflessly 
set about doing it; and as a result, of doing good things for others, their happiness could remain 
robust in the face of nearly anything they might come across in their lives. Not only did they 
acquire dividends but so did others in their community, who would learn from the historical 
examples they set. They not only set selfless examples of a type of higher happiness, moreover 
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they sent the message of the newfound freedom from selfish anxiety that comes with this way of 
life. And when one puts rationality, flourishing and benevolence of both human and sentient 
beings at the forefront of a bankable way of life, one’s own wellbeing is bound to be affected. 
These affects are easily seen and readable by almost anyone at a human level. They become part 
of our very nature; and once we load this part called selflessness into the happiness bank, with 
integrity, this threefold philosophy is bound to lead to what humans know as happiness. To be 
happy is a self-evident human right, and something that is intrinsically good, and is an end in 
itself. Selfless happiness is something that nobody can rightfully take away from you. The 
memories we create through the actions we take can last a lifetime, for ourselves and others, as 
we make our deposits in the happiness bank: these are the things we cherish. No person, place or 
thing on this earth may rightfully remove these memories from us. 
 So how else does selflessness play a part in the happiness bank? First of all the happiness 
bank, if worked properly, between ourselves and others, always allows us to be free from the 
destructive emotions of anger and resentment. It is the fact that most humans are self-centered, 
the opposite of selfless. When things don’t go their way they get angry. Anger only leads to 
futility and self-pity. In this way the spirit gets cut off, self-centeredness comes in and humans 
are no longer giving to others selflessly. One cannot afford things that could block us from our 
sense of happiness, integrity and selflessness. We will want to be patient and tolerant of 
humanity and hopeful of their future participation in the happiness bank and the spirit in it will 
take them to better things. With each person we come across, we should ask ourselves in a 
selfless manner, how may I be of assistance to each and every one of them? 
  
HAPPINESS AS A BANKABLE WAY OF LIFE 
And so why do I, as a person, find this way of life to include the ideals, concepts and virtues we have 
discussed within the happiness bank so important and something whole communities would want to 
essentially subscribe to? 
 Will people have the desire to keep topping up the happiness bank for the good of all 
concerned? People have gained material possessions and lost them, sometimes many times over in 
their lifetime. I am speaking in terms of peace of mind, serenity and of course our ultimate good, 
human happiness. It is a cliché, but a true and paradoxical one, that we must give away whatever we 
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have so that we may keep it.  A person may have lost, regained and perhaps lost again all of their 
important worldly possessions, but in the process find a true treasure. That treasure opens for them in 
the realization of human capital. Let us take an example: 
 Bill loses everything he owns through a bitter divorce settlement. He is left with very little after 
he pays out his portion of expenses and child support. It looks as though Bill’s life is to be like this for 
years to come. He may never ever own a home again. However, through Bill’s attitude adjustment to 
his circumstances he begins to make small deposits into the happiness bank. It was not Bill’s 
overwhelming circumstances that needed changing, it was his attitude and outlook on life. Moreover, 
these deposits in the happiness bank need not be huge especially in Bill’s case, remember he does not 
have much. The real difference maker for someone in Bill’s circumstances is that he can find 
community organizations such as the Red Cross, Salvation Army and the Rotary that he can become 
involved in, to help him turn his small fundamental deposits into much larger ones. Bill helps others, 
thus making deposits in the happiness bank, he undergoes a psychic change. This allows him to feel 
and do things he could never do before.   
 The focus of all this comes into view when Bill, somewhere down the road, realizes, after 
taking these actions for some time, that even though he has regained his material things as a result of 
his actions, they are only important to him as they help him to help others find the happiness bank or 
see a glimpse of what happiness is when in troubled times.  
 So the answer to the question: Will people keep topping up their happiness bank, is yes, once 
they see the overwhelming evidence in favor of it. Simply put, we, like so many people try to live a life 
of self-propulsion, i.e. a life devoted to satisfying self-directed desires. This type of self-centered being 
is strictly unmanageable. The reason is, we are constantly racing from thought to thought instead of 
from positive reinforced action to action. The virtues acted on properly placed in the happiness bank 
tell the why of it. We simply can and must have a reason to believe we are taking right harmonious 
actions. And it can also be an action harmonious with, not just ourselves or our community or our 
consciousness, but with the world. 
 In the beginning and even now, many years later deposits into the happiness bank will be 
varied. We must realize if these deposits are for us alone, we will get very little benefit from them. We 
must put ourselves first and foremost in another person’s shoes. We may be called upon to sit long 
70 
 
days or nights in many situations, with despairing families, wives or loved ones, even children. One 
needs to set this as an exemplary way of life for others to not only want, but also to follow. 
 However, there may be those who might call this happiness bank and its succeeding way of life 
a type of utopia which just isn’t possible for humans or logical. Moreover, they would point out that no 
community or individuals are happy all the time. In fact, they would embrace the fact that a great part 
of our world is indeed miserable. Based on one’s experience the truth seems to be that misery shares 
good company. Therefore, for those of us who treasure everyone’s happiness, to manufacture misery 
just for the sake of being right is no justification at all. On the other hand, the deliberate manufacture 
of an ultimate happiness made from virtues performed well for others to witness, makes a truly 
bankable decision that will yield great dividends going forward. Once a person, anyone, is able to tap 
into this happiness bank and doing so becomes a way of life, they have a responsibility to pass it on to 
others.  
 The happiness bank does not work strictly based on deposits. If this were the case, the entrie 
premise of the happiness bank concept would never work. The idea hs been derived from the 
relationship between integrity, selflessness and happiness, that allows humans to add their own 
virtuous actions and to want to volunteer. Free riding on the happiness bank, that is, making 
withdrawals without at any stage making deposits, is never an issue. One does not withdraw happiness 
itself from the happiness bank. One withdraws the help, consolation, and good will from the 
community, which can result later in happiness, but is not itself happiness. It is true, that the free-rider 
gains a benefit from the community, and may come to see the benefits of contributing, but they are not 
made robustly happy by withdrawing from the happiness bank. Robust happiness requires integrity and 
selflessness. This is why a person would want to pass on their happiness to others and to contribute to 
the happiness bank. It is not they are obligated to do so, but that they are virtuously motivated to do so.  
 There might be some prima facie disadvantages to the idea of the happiness bank. For example, 
it might encourage free-riding of the goodness of the community. It might emphasize the help of 
strangers over that of loved ones.  Selflessness might encourage self-abnegation and a lack of genuine 
humility. I don’t believe these disadvantages are significant. I respond to them here, in my discussion 
of humility in chapter 4 (page 62) and in my discussion of free-riding above.. 
 Is it ethically justifiable to make a withdrawal from the happiness bank if one is not already “in 
credit” with it from having contributed to it oneself? This very much depends upon what one does 
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next. It is ethically wrong to exploit the good wishes and the aid of others without being willing, if 
able, to reciprocate. How does the happiness bank accommodate the common preference to be helped 
by a loved one rather than someone who is a total stranger? Most people would under normal 
circumstances find it difficult to take in, for example, an uncle who has cancer. This is a hard burden 
for any family or individual to bear. The happiness bank ameliorates this situation.. Many people may 
contribute as they are able to, because they know they have received so much from the society they 
have benefitted from.  Also they desire to give back to the others in this selfless regard which in turn 
gives them a sense of integrity.  This ‘happiness bank’ is not designed to overtax any individual.  
Everyone contributes and shares the burden for all who are in need. Our preference to be helped by 
those who to are close to us is compatible with this, but the limits of what individuals can do for each 
other must also be recognized. Sometimes a community is needed to share the burden and this is the 
fundamental idea of the happiness bank. 
 Ethics alone could not build this vision the happiness bank entails. Withdrawing and depositing 
alone will not build the edifice. It is the vision of the virtuous action itself that makes the happiness 
bank a human aspiration. The things one deposits only for oneself are somehow lost in a self-centered 
sea of humanity. However, the rightful deposits made in the name of a frail, ill, hurt or down trodden 
person are never lost, but are lasting in a high percentage bearing account that is used by others. These 
examples of bonds may be drawn out when needed to convince others that the bank indeed works. The 
things that count as a savings deposit are any actions one takes towards others that show compassion 
and are beneficial in nature to people. By doing this we are showing the common good of humanity. It 
could be said that this happiness bank is reciprocal in nature, whether the person holding the passbook 
is depositing or withdrawing, as long as the account is active for other possible members. The reason is 
these accumulated dividends of savings and investments are vital to people and hold a very high value 
in relation to any other account. 
 Happiness need not be just a fond memory of a time gone by, but may become part of one’s 
lifestyle. Furthermore, happiness need not be used up in a day but as a way of life, may be drawn upon 
like a bank account. Therefore, when a person continues to deposit into the happiness bank in a selfless 
manner they know these investments are not just for them but for anyone who may be in need.  
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THE HAPPINESS BANK AND CONTEMPORARY VIRTUE ETHICS 
In this section, I will compare my concept of the happiness with some contemporary writing on 
happiness and virtue. In her paper “Happiness as Achievement” Julia Annas is critical of the idea 
of happiness as desire satisfaction. I think she is right to be critical. She writes:  
The idea that happiness is desire-satisfaction seems suitably neutral 
on the content of happy lives, allowing happiness to the intellectual 
and the incurious alike as long as they are getting what they desire. 
It is possible to think of happiness as desire-satisfaction if we are 
prepared to think of happiness … as something on which each of 
us is in authority. I am happy if I think I am, since I am getting 
what I want. For who could be a better authority than I am on the 
issue of whether I am getting what I want? (Annas, 2004, p. 46) 
 
Annas goes on to cite examples of people who might fit the category, like Nelson Mandela, 
Madonna and Bill Gates, and notes that there would be no grounds to compare the happiness of 
their lives as long as each is getting what they want. But since it makes sense to say that one 
person can be happier than another even if both are getting what they want, happiness is not 
simply about getting what you want. People may think they are happy on the surface, however, 
they can be wrong. According to my account of happiness, a person who thinks wrongly that 
they are happy is wrong because they are working with a false concept of happiness. This false 
concept doesn’t hold up on a long-term basis. A person can get what they want, but if they want 
the wrong sorts of things, this will bring misery. If their happiness depends upon always getting 
what they want, it is a fragile thing. On the other hand, if a person is genuinely happy, if their 
happiness is based on their contributions to the happiness bank, their happiness will be robust. 
Selflessness is the key. To be happy is not to get what one wants for oneself, but to be absorbed 
into the good of others and to be focused on others, not oneself.  
 On my account of happiness, a person is likely to be authoritative about their own 
happiness provided they have the correct idea of happiness and are not self-deceived about their 
motives. A genuinely happy person will know perfectly well that they are happy, because they 
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will know that their life is based on selfless concern for others. This is something one can be 
authoritative about. Integrity can be gleaned from this way of life, so integrity is also something 
one can be authoritative about. The reason I disagree with the Annas’ account of happiness is 
because of the selflessness factor. We cannot hold this happiness only for ourselves, it must be 
given away to others, and in this case in the form of a bank, for us to keep it, our achievement of 
happiness must be a shared account in life. 
 Is Annas correct to think of happiness as an achievement? Annas writes that “happiness 
has an essential connection with my life as a whole and the thought that happiness is an 
achievement on my part.” (Annas, 2004, p. 47) So is Annas right to think that it is an 
achievement of the whole of a life? This is Aristotle’s idea of eudaimonia. But even if we put it 
on the scale of a lifetime, happiness can vary over time. It isn’t a property of the whole of a life. 
It is something one must work for: thinking of others first and foremost. So it is an achievement, 
but it is not a whole of life achievement. It is the achievement of selfless integrity itself. Imagine 
a person who constantly works to selflessly help others, but who, for one reason or another, is 
never successful in making others happy or consoling them. Are they happy? I think they are. 
Annas, and Aristotle, would think they are not. My reason for thinking they are happy is that 
from their own point of view they are selflessly absorbed in the good of others and take deep 
satisfaction from this. And they really are selfless absorbed in the good of others. 
 Consider a person who thinks they are actually being selfless but really are not. For 
example, they spend their days caring for an ill relative, and in this case, instead of genuinely 
helping the relative, they enjoy the power and control they have over her and they enable her 
continuing illness rather than helping her overcome it. Are they happy? I think not because they 
are not really absorbed in the good of others, they are merely pretending to themselves that they 
are. They are contented, to a degree, but not happy. They fail to make contributions to the 
happiness bank; and they have no happiness bank to make withdrawals from. People in this 
situation tend to become very isolated. 
 Annas is right to insist that we are not just happy because are getting what we want. 
Happiness is much more than that. It is nonetheless a state of mind. This state of mind only exists 
because the virtues exist, doing the right thing exists and as a result a good life exists. The 
happiness bank changes one’s way of thinking and life. As I mentioned earlier, I think that the 
missing ingredient in Annas’ account of happiness is selflessness. This is what makes the 
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difference between a type of arrival formula of happiness, in which one arrives at happiness as a 
final destination, and a never ending selfless struggle that holds up under all conditions. Human 
self-centeredness can be easily be pointed towards the wrong kind of objectives. Turned inside 
out into selflessness we become more concerned with others and their needs.  
In the Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy article on ‘Virtue Ethics’ by Rosalind 
Hursthouse and Glen Pettigrove, Hursthouse and Pettigrove state all the “usual versions of virtue 
ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for Eudaimonia” (2016, p. 4). 
The constant working of the virtues gives one the best chance at a happy, well lived life. 
Although things such a fate, chance or luck may intervene, one will find throughout this process 
that the key is to not own one’s own life. That is, the key is to live for others, not for oneself. 
This turns out to be the best life possible. In my opinion it also makes it the easiest way to be a 
contributor to the happiness bank. The reason is as follows. 
To grow as a human being and build character is not something that may be done in 
isolation or through self-centered behavior. To develop selflessness, integrity and to work 
towards the virtues as a life goal, could take a lifetime to achieve. We begin to get a glimpse of a 
promising life ahead. We find we are no longer self-centered and greedy or at least markedly 
better than we might have been. 
According to Hursthouse and Pettigrove’s article, “Eudaimonism in virtue ethics is the 
view that the good life is the eudaimon because the virtues are those character traits that benefit 
their possessor …barring bad luck. (2016, p. 5) This contrasts with two other theories of virtue 
ethics: pluralism and naturalism. According to pluralism, “the good life is the morally 
meritorious life, and the morally meritorious life is one that is response to the demands of the 
world…” (2016, p.5). There are many things that might make a trait virtuous and there is no 
reason to think that they all produce happiness or eudaimonia. Naturalism is the view that virtues 
are forms of natural human excellence; to be virtuous is to be a good human being in the way 
that a good alligator might be good, i.e. good at being an alligator. Excellence doesn’t 
necessarily produce happiness.  
Being virtuous, in my view, leads one to selfless concern for others and conduct in accord 
with this. Selflessness – one that involves living with integrity with ourselves and the world 
around us – all but guarantees happiness. Unhappiness is caused, by and large, by excessive self-
centeredness. Without it, happiness is relatively easy to come by.  So a truly virtuous person will 
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almost certainly be happy. Eudaimonists differ about their idea of happiness; the most valuable 
idea of happiness is one that leads to deep enjoyment of life, a lack of self-pity and anxiety and a 
positive attitude to life. One gets this justification from one’s contribution to the happiness bank. 
And in times of difficulty, one gets help and consolation from the happiness bank that is from 
one’s community.  
Hursthouse and Pettigrove write:  
It is the exercise of the virtues during one’s life that is held to be at 
least partially constitutive of Eudaimonia, and this is consistent 
with recognizing that bad luck may land the virtuous agent in 
circumstances that require her to give up her life. Given the sorts 
of considerations that courageous, honest, loyal, charitable people 
wholeheartedly recognize as reasons for action, they may find 
themselves compelled to face danger for a worthwhile end, to 
speak out in someone’s defense, or refuse to reveal the names of 
their comrades, even when they know that this will inevitably lead 
to their execution, to share their last crust and face starvation. On 
the view that the exercise of the virtues is necessary but not 
sufficient for Eudaimonia, such cases are described as those in 
which the virtuous agent sees that, as things have unfortunately 
turned out, eudaimonia is not possible for them. (2016, p. 8). 
 
If we think of eudaimonia as a complete condition of a life, this makes good sense. But if we 
think of happiness instead, and think of happiness as deep enjoyment of life, a positive attitude, 
and an absence of anxiety, then even people who are about to sacrifice their life can be happy.    
The exercise of the virtues and a willingness to make sacrifices in the face of danger 
becomes an inspiration for others. Examples of this noted earlier in this thesis include Martin 
Luther King, Nelson Mandela, Mother Theresa, and Abraham Lincoln. 
 Hursthouse and Pettigrove write:  
 
It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy, or 
on whether my life, as a whole, has been a happy one, for, barring, 
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perhaps, advanced cases of self-deception and the suppression of 
unconscious misery, if I think I am happy then I am – it is not 
something I can be wrong about. Contrast my being healthy or 
flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might 
think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think 
that I was flourishing and just be plain wrong. In this respect 
“flourishing” is a better translation than “happiness”. It is all too 
easy for me to be mistaken about whether my life is eudaimon (the 
adjective from eudaimonia) not simply because it is easy to 
deceive oneself, but because it is easy to have a mistaken 
conception of Eudaimonia, or what it is to live well as a human 
being, believing it to consist largely in physical pleasure or luxury 
for example. (2016, p.14) 
  
Eudaimonia differentiates from happiness in the respect that happiness arises out of a general 
concern for the welfare of other people first and foremost. This concern for others isn’t the same 
thing as flourishing. Nonetheless, we can be mistaken about our own happiness in cases when it 
involves only ourselves and our desires. If it doesn’t involve the good of a second or third 
person, it is a false happiness. If we mistakenly think we are being selfless when we are not, as in 
the case above the care-giver, we can be wrong about our own happiness. In the case of the 
snow-skier, the appearance of happiness was misleading. Happiness is not real if it can vanish so 
easily.   It is when I am concerned with others and their happiness, the happiness bank fills. I will 
not be mistaken about my happiness when I see the results of what living well is, when I put 
others ahead of my own wants and desires. Happiness will have found me. 
 Aristotle, like Aquinas, believes virtuous activity will point us towards happiness, but 
Aristotle thinks it will bring good fortune as well, and will lead us to become a good and noble 
citizens and be well regarded among our peers. However, in Aristotle’s time his peers were the 
elite in society. The down trodden, down on their luck, would have no happiness bank to turn to 
if they relied upon their gaining the regard of the elite. There is no end strategy in this life when 
it comes to happiness, but happiness is a byproduct of living a life of integrity and selflessness. 
Therefore, it is best not to search for happiness as an end result in life. In the same way, it is best 
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not to search for the good opinions of others as an end result. Happiness arises out of our putting 
others’ lives ahead of our own. The good opinion of others is worthless unless it is based on this 
foundation. Someone who manages to be perfectly selfless, and does so with integrity, cannot be 
unhappy. This is why I disagree with the version of Eudemonism described by Hursthouse and 
Pettigrove.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Let me summarize the view I have developed in this thesis. In chapter 1 I examined the virtue of 
integrity. In chapter 2 I set out my understanding of selflessness and put it in the context of 
utilitarianism and the demand to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number. In 
chapter 3 I explored MacIntyre’s perception about virtues as a part of our own status as 
dependent rational animals. In chapter 4 I discussed Aristotle’s views about distinctive human 
happiness or the good life and I examined Thomas Aquinas’s view that happiness can be both 
human and divine. Divine happiness is our reward in the next life, according to Aquinas. This 
final chapter has been an attempt to bring all this together under the idea of the happiness bank 
and discover the link the between happiness, integrity and selflessness. I have sought to establish 
that the key that unlocks the door to happiness is selflessness. I would claim that a person who 
fully achieves selflessness is very unlikely to be unhappy in life. The reason is simple. 
Unhappiness is a product of self-centeredness.  
 In Dependent Rational Animals MacIntyre refers to the ill, the disabled, the infirmed and 
the down trodden. This became a major point of my happiness bank theme and just how it might 
work along with selflessness and integrity. At this point, however, I would like to add one more 
example of the happiness bank. There is a great urge to tackle youth unemployment rate 
worldwide. It has been said that whole generations may be lost to joblessness, types of 
desperation in inner cities or rural areas, and of course the migration crisis. This at a time in these 
young people’s lives when they should have the opportunity to build these three pillars of 
integrity, selflessness and the virtues, which can lead to the good life and happiness. Instead of 
pushing these young people to the margins of society, the happiness bank is a better solution; a 
better beginning, instead of an endless pit of despair. This happiness bank may just be the force 
that can re-ignite their talents and enthusiasms. Through the use of the mentor program within 
the happiness bank, they can get a new start. This happiness bank for the twenty-first century is a 
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solution to this problem or at least the beginnings of such a solution. In this case it could not only 
be the lifting of these youthful, vibrant people from despair to a level in life far beyond their 
imagination. To work with others, with one common goal of integrity and selflessness and to 
bring one’s community or nation to this remarkable way of life is a gift. This gift may or may not 
come from a higher authority. I leave the question of the metaphysical basis of any such 
authority to one side. Instead, I will talk about the evidence for this theory shortly. However, to 
return to the issue of youth unemployment and alienation: consider an historical example. In 
1960 then President of the United States of America, John F. Kennedy submitted by executive 
order the idea of a new army. However, this army would be the first of its kind and would be 
peaceful. This army was called the Peace Corps, and it was an entirely volunteer army. It would 
depend on mostly young people travelling to undeveloped, underprivileged nations. The idea 
Kennedy had was to help young people gain experiences, work and represent their country, help 
other people who were struggling, etc. The intended effect was to help people in other lands help 
themselves, and also to change young people’s experiences and character forever. Kennedy 
believed that the freedom of the United States depended on other nations’ ability to live in 
dignity and out of poverty. It sounds like a type of nation building happiness bank.  
 Earlier in the chapter, I mentioned the problem of youth unemployment, pushing young 
people to desperation and the margins of society. An extreme form of this is found in the 
prevalence of solitary confinement within the U.S. prison system (and other systems to a lesser 
extent). 
Lisa Guenther in her article ‘The Concrete Abyss’ has written about this 
prevalence. She offers a phenomenological account of the experience of solitary 
confinement. 
1. “We are social beings who rely on our interactions with other 
people to make sense of things” this also forms our perception 
of the world. (2014, p. 3) 
2. Most prisoners who live in isolation fly in the face of what is 
necessary for fully human existence, that Martin Heidegger 
describes in ‘Being and Time (1927) where he says, “we exist 
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as being-in-the-world, in a complex interrelation with a 
situation to which we have been thrown”. (2014, p. 3) 
3. Phenomenology can make this web of relations visible, even 
the simplest everyday experiences. (2014, p. 3) 
In Guenther’s experience with prisoners who have been subjected to prolonged isolation, the five 
senses become no longer a recognizable human characteristic. In fact many of these long-term 
isolated prisoners claim to have become invisible as a human or to be caught in a living death. It 
is possible to reduce the life of a person to such an extent, that happiness is no longer possible for 
them and they no longer feel fully human. Among many, I agree that living in the answer could 
help solve many of the human race’s perplexities. We simply must communicate and try to fix 
systems that are broken. Sometimes they are too much to handle. However, one must make a 
start. The happiness bank is necessary if we are to make such a start.  
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